By Ikramullah
October 21, 2009
The green signal by the Government of Pakistan has finally been given to the armed forces. The internal and external challenges, involving, besides many other factors, had created such a critical situation, culminating in a national security crisis, that hardly any other option was left before the government. The federal government, led by the Pakistan Peoples’ Party, could not possibly take such a decision without taking all the major political forces in confidence, both inside and outside the Parliament. Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, who had just returned from China, rose to the occasion and called the civil and military leadership of Pakistan on Friday morning (October 16), for a joint meeting to make the momentous decision at this critical juncture of Pakistan’s history. Before presiding over the roundtable conference, Prime Minister Gilani called on President Asif Ali Zardari at Aiwan-E-Sadr in Islamabad to apprise him of the challenges facing the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. And also about his proposed strategy to deal with the alarming threat posed by the new wave of terrorism spreading like fire, engulfing the major cities including Islamabad, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Kohat and Peshawar. I believe that time has come to rise above party politics and face the stark reality - Pakistan’s survival is at stake.
The Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani along with his top operational and intelligence chiefs had been specially invited to this crucial meeting. Besides them, leaders of different political parties including Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, Asfandyar Wali Khan, Mian Shahbaz Sharif, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, Dr Farooq Sattar, Senator Israrullah Zehri, Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, and other senior government official were also present during the meeting, in order to take the nation into confidence through their elected representatives. Undoubtedly, the credit for managing to get together this rare galaxy of political leadership at a short notice goes not only to Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s leadership but also the patriotism of the national leadership that rose to the occasion recognising the grave threat to the very existence of the state. I stress this point because in this demonstration of national unity lies the strength of our nation.
The political leadership of Pakistan has entrusted to the armed forces the arduous task of safeguarding the territorial integrity. There was free discussion over nuts and bolts of the planned offensive in Waziristan including internally displaced persons and their management as undertaken by the joint efforts of the civil and military authorities during the Swat and Malakand Operation. Lt Gen Nadeem Ahmad, who had taken care of the IDPs from Swat and their safe return to their homes, was also present in the Prime Minister’s meeting indicating the details covered during the four hour long meeting. The political leadership representing the Pakistani nation is believed to have not only granted unanimous approval of the likely operation in Waziristan but assured full support to the armed forces in this extremely difficult venture in a difficult terrain during the coming winter. It is believed that soon after the green signal from the government, the army has now swung into action in South Waziristan with imposition of curfew in different areas from early morning on October 17. The operation is likely to end successfully and hopefully before the start of the New Year. It is estimated that over a lac and quarter population is likely to be evacuated to safer areas in NWFP, Punjab and Balochistan. The army is likely to place the entire area of South Waziristan under surveillance in order to prevent any outside intervention in the operational area. This has put the government as well as the armed forces under the most critical test since the birth of Pakistan. To come out victorious the armed forces will need undivided and total support of the entire nation. I am confident the nation shall not fail in its duty and shall adhere to “Unity Faith and Discipline”, the call of the Founder of the nation Quaid-i-Azam at the fateful moment of every national crisis.
Courtesy: The Nation
Showing posts with label militants. Show all posts
Showing posts with label militants. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Terrorist surge and its implications
TARIQ OSMAN HYDER
October 21, 2009
There has been a surge of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The most audacious being the precision assault on the headquarters of the Pakistan Army followed by the coordinated triple attack on FIA and Police establishments in Lahore, accompanied by daily bomb blasts. The army is now a major target after its largely successful operation in Swat and because of a major offensive under way in South Waziristan, followed by the FIA and Police. The Swat operation was a milestone in the counter terrorism campaign. It was made possible only by the build-up of public, political and media support, on which the sustainability of the effort depends.
For the outside world and Pakistan this spate of attacks raises a number of questions. Is the security situation deteriorating and will the military, paramilitary and police forces be put on the defensive with heightened public insecurity eroding public morale? What response strategy can deliver? The US media has criticised the army's security for not stopping the attack at the outermost security cordon perimeter. This critique implies that the military's capacity in the counter terrorism campaign depends in significant part on the controversial Kerry-Lugar assistance legislation.
To analyse what the present situation portends one must view this struggle between the forces for a progressive Pakistan and the militants' vision of a theocratic Pakistan in the context of national dynamics, regional and international parallels and of the timescale and resources required to win this battle for the soul of Pakistan.
As far as the Pakistan Army is concerned, while lessons should be learnt, the attack on its HQ was contained and took time to end because of the hostages. America, the most advanced country in the world was unable to prevent 9/11. The Mumbai attack virtually took another metropolis hostage. Despite massive military and monetary intervention in Iraq, the security situation has forced America into an exit strategy. While even more resources and troops are being poured into Afghanistan, attacks against civilians and the military are far higher than in Pakistan with its eleven times larger population.
Pakistan, like most developing countries and Muslim countries, is a fractured society with significant gaps between haves and have-nots. Developmental efforts have not been well planned or competently administered due to the lack of political stability or good governance and deteriorating state institutions. The hegemonistic ambitions of India and its unwillingness to move on the Kashmir dispute necessitated large defence expenditures. The erosion of the government's public education system has divided the youth into three streams: those attending private schools who reap the opportunities; those going to government schools who are at a grave disadvantage; and the resourceless multitude attending the madrassahs, which had a revered place in Muslim education, but since the American sponsored Afghan Jihad have become the driving force for discontented youth.
The battle against the militants has become multi-dimensional. In border regions, military counter insurgency coupled with re-establishing administration and development will predominate. In settled areas, urban warfare with the terrorists using asymmetrical acts of explosive violence and precision attacks against the symbols of the state will have to be dealt with through different tactics including better intelligence gathering and coordination to more aggressively utilising existing military and civil resources.
The strength of the militants and their access to arms from Afghanistan is dependent on funding. Some comes from drug money and hostile intelligence agencies across the border. A small part is raised within Pakistan. However the largest amount is received by transfers using both banking and illegal channels. This is borne out by the fact that while from documented remittance flows some seven billion dollars a year comes from overseas workers, a grey area of four million dollars comes ostensibly for charitable, educational and other purposes from other parties. Pakistan must forcibly address this problem with known conduit countries and by activating its investigative and regulatory mechanisms, including the State Bank's Financial Investigation Unit and the FIA. Certainly, the United States has the muscle to do more on this vital external funding front.
It will take five to 10 years to defeat the militant threat. The East Punjab insurgency in a far smaller area took 10 years to overcome, the LTTE 30 years. It will take a generation to reverse causational social conditions. That is the scale on which to assess whether or not the security situation in Pakistan is deteriorating. The militants have been hard hit and are fighting back to break the public and governmental resolve. Continued military operations in South Waziristan and elsewhere will lead to increased terrorist attacks, but the losses they inflict should be far less than what is meted out to them.
While democracy must be strengthened, the army remains the strongest and most cohesive force in Pakistan which can tackle the terrorist threat. However, its counterinsurgency and surveillance capabilities must be improved. Equally important, socio-economic development has to be accelerated.
The now passed Kerry-Lugar Bill contains clauses detrimental to Pakistan's self-respect which should have been modified. However, the controversy missed the main point that if America and its Western allies are serious about defeating terrorism the assistance must be at least three to five times more in order to help Pakistan overcome this threat, part of a global terrorist network strengthened by their occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Pakistan must also diversify incoming assistance, lessen dependence on American military assistance, expand and add value to its exports to generate its own resources. Our window of vulnerability lies in our deficit balance of payments, between what we earn and what we spend, which necessitates external assistance from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and bilateral sources with inevitable conditionalities, which circumscribes our freedom of manoeuvre and policy choices.
Without adequate multinational economic and military equipment support and also action by the Extra Regional Forces to control the border from the Afghan side, the battle in Pakistan will take far longer. It is also in India's interest to live up to its declared objective of wanting good relations with a stable Pakistan. Certainly, if there is evidence to the contrary it must be made public by our government.
The writer is a retired Pakistani diplomat.
Courtesy: The Nation
October 21, 2009
There has been a surge of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The most audacious being the precision assault on the headquarters of the Pakistan Army followed by the coordinated triple attack on FIA and Police establishments in Lahore, accompanied by daily bomb blasts. The army is now a major target after its largely successful operation in Swat and because of a major offensive under way in South Waziristan, followed by the FIA and Police. The Swat operation was a milestone in the counter terrorism campaign. It was made possible only by the build-up of public, political and media support, on which the sustainability of the effort depends.
For the outside world and Pakistan this spate of attacks raises a number of questions. Is the security situation deteriorating and will the military, paramilitary and police forces be put on the defensive with heightened public insecurity eroding public morale? What response strategy can deliver? The US media has criticised the army's security for not stopping the attack at the outermost security cordon perimeter. This critique implies that the military's capacity in the counter terrorism campaign depends in significant part on the controversial Kerry-Lugar assistance legislation.
To analyse what the present situation portends one must view this struggle between the forces for a progressive Pakistan and the militants' vision of a theocratic Pakistan in the context of national dynamics, regional and international parallels and of the timescale and resources required to win this battle for the soul of Pakistan.
As far as the Pakistan Army is concerned, while lessons should be learnt, the attack on its HQ was contained and took time to end because of the hostages. America, the most advanced country in the world was unable to prevent 9/11. The Mumbai attack virtually took another metropolis hostage. Despite massive military and monetary intervention in Iraq, the security situation has forced America into an exit strategy. While even more resources and troops are being poured into Afghanistan, attacks against civilians and the military are far higher than in Pakistan with its eleven times larger population.
Pakistan, like most developing countries and Muslim countries, is a fractured society with significant gaps between haves and have-nots. Developmental efforts have not been well planned or competently administered due to the lack of political stability or good governance and deteriorating state institutions. The hegemonistic ambitions of India and its unwillingness to move on the Kashmir dispute necessitated large defence expenditures. The erosion of the government's public education system has divided the youth into three streams: those attending private schools who reap the opportunities; those going to government schools who are at a grave disadvantage; and the resourceless multitude attending the madrassahs, which had a revered place in Muslim education, but since the American sponsored Afghan Jihad have become the driving force for discontented youth.
The battle against the militants has become multi-dimensional. In border regions, military counter insurgency coupled with re-establishing administration and development will predominate. In settled areas, urban warfare with the terrorists using asymmetrical acts of explosive violence and precision attacks against the symbols of the state will have to be dealt with through different tactics including better intelligence gathering and coordination to more aggressively utilising existing military and civil resources.
The strength of the militants and their access to arms from Afghanistan is dependent on funding. Some comes from drug money and hostile intelligence agencies across the border. A small part is raised within Pakistan. However the largest amount is received by transfers using both banking and illegal channels. This is borne out by the fact that while from documented remittance flows some seven billion dollars a year comes from overseas workers, a grey area of four million dollars comes ostensibly for charitable, educational and other purposes from other parties. Pakistan must forcibly address this problem with known conduit countries and by activating its investigative and regulatory mechanisms, including the State Bank's Financial Investigation Unit and the FIA. Certainly, the United States has the muscle to do more on this vital external funding front.
It will take five to 10 years to defeat the militant threat. The East Punjab insurgency in a far smaller area took 10 years to overcome, the LTTE 30 years. It will take a generation to reverse causational social conditions. That is the scale on which to assess whether or not the security situation in Pakistan is deteriorating. The militants have been hard hit and are fighting back to break the public and governmental resolve. Continued military operations in South Waziristan and elsewhere will lead to increased terrorist attacks, but the losses they inflict should be far less than what is meted out to them.
While democracy must be strengthened, the army remains the strongest and most cohesive force in Pakistan which can tackle the terrorist threat. However, its counterinsurgency and surveillance capabilities must be improved. Equally important, socio-economic development has to be accelerated.
The now passed Kerry-Lugar Bill contains clauses detrimental to Pakistan's self-respect which should have been modified. However, the controversy missed the main point that if America and its Western allies are serious about defeating terrorism the assistance must be at least three to five times more in order to help Pakistan overcome this threat, part of a global terrorist network strengthened by their occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Pakistan must also diversify incoming assistance, lessen dependence on American military assistance, expand and add value to its exports to generate its own resources. Our window of vulnerability lies in our deficit balance of payments, between what we earn and what we spend, which necessitates external assistance from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and bilateral sources with inevitable conditionalities, which circumscribes our freedom of manoeuvre and policy choices.
Without adequate multinational economic and military equipment support and also action by the Extra Regional Forces to control the border from the Afghan side, the battle in Pakistan will take far longer. It is also in India's interest to live up to its declared objective of wanting good relations with a stable Pakistan. Certainly, if there is evidence to the contrary it must be made public by our government.
The writer is a retired Pakistani diplomat.
Courtesy: The Nation
Forgotten lessons of history
Roedad Khan
October 21, 2009
On Saturday last, the army launched an operation, code-named Rah-i-Nijat against Mehsud strongholds in South Waziristan. "Both air and ground troops are taking part", Major General Athar Abbas, Chief of the Inter-Services Public Relation told the journalists. Earlier Army Chief General Kayani briefed the political leadership on the "imperative" of the operation against the Mehsuds. The die is cast. An invisible Rubicon crossed.
With this operation Pakistan is launched on the path to a protracted, inconclusive war in the mountains of Waziristan. The decision to commit our forces to such a war is, in my view, a tragic error. Waziristan may not be Vietnam but it has its own river of history that General Kayani is now stepping into.
Once again, there is a dry wind blowing throughout Waziristan and parched grasses wait the spark. Now that the match is lit, the blaze may spread like wildfire throughout the tribal area. Talking about Waziristan, a Mehsud tribesman told a missionary doctor at Bannu: "When God created the world there were a lot of stones and rocks and other lumber left over which were all dumped down on this frontier".
In the early 1900s, a crusty British general, Andrew Skeen, wrote a guide to military operation in Waziristan. His first piece of advice: "When planning a military expedition into Pashtun tribal areas, the first thing you must plan is your retreat. All expeditions into this area sooner or later end in retreat under fire".
The British decision to send troops into the Khaisora valley in November 1936 which transformed Ipi's agitation into a full scale uprising almost over night and set Waziristan on fire which lasted until after 1947. The British failed to capture Ipi and the campaign had to be called off. The judgment displayed by the British and the poor intelligence upon which they based their decisions were chiefly to blame for the disasters that followed. This was the last major rebellion in Waziristan which stemmed from an abrupt change of policy.
The tribesmen's unrivalled fighting record, their ability to intervene in Afghan affairs and to involve Afghans in their own affairs, were factors ignored by the British that made Waziristan different from other Frontier areas. This disastrous attempt to "pacify" Waziristan was the last of several major incursions into tribal territory during the hundred years of Britain's presence in Northwest India. On each occasion the tribes and the mountains won a strategic victory, despite local tactical reverses, and the bulk of the Indian troops were forced to withdraw back into the plains of the Indus valley. The British soon learned that you can annex land but not people.
When the British left, Pakistan had reason to be glad that it had inherited a secure North West Frontier. In September 1947, Mr. Jinnah took a bold decision to reverse the "pacification" policy, withdrew regular troops from Waziristan and entered into new agreements with the tribes. Cunningham, the new governor of NWFP, appointed by Mr Jinnah was a Frontier expert. His disillusion with the "pacification" policy was complete. "I think that we must now face a complete change of policy. Razmak has been occupied by regular troops for nearly 25 years. Wana for a few years less. The occupation of Waziristan has been a failure. It has not achieved peace or any appreciable economic development. It ties up an unreasonably large number of troops, and for the last 10 years there have been frequent major and minor offenses against the troops." The change in policy produced dramatic results and paid rich dividends.
All this has now changed. Mr Jinnah's Waziristan policy which had stood the test of time has been reversed. Our troops are back in Waziristan. Some time back, the commander of the US led troops in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Borno, let the cat out of the bag when he said that US and Pakistani forces were working together like "hammer and anvil" to trap Osama and Al Qaeda forces along the border".
Those who know the Frontier are deeply concerned. The Pakistan government is playing with fire. By reversing Mr Jinnah's Waziristan policy, at the behest of Americans, it has alienated powerful tribes in Waziristan and unsettled our western border which had remained peaceful for 62 years since the birth of Pakistan.
The nation is beginning to see the rapidly unfurling consequences of General Musharraf's fateful decision to join the "coalition of the coerced". America's dreaded war on terror has indisputably arrived on Pakistan's soil. Pakistan is slipping into anarchy and stands on the brink of civil war. A perfect storm is looming on the horizon.
We have stumbled into a war that we cannot fight and win for the simple reason that we don't seem to realize what guerrilla war is like. We are sending conventional troops to do an unconventional job. I can foresee a perilous voyage. The war in Waziristan cannot be won because it is perceived as the white man's war. It could be won only if perceived by the powerful tribes as Pakistan's own war. That, unfortunately, is not how they perceive this war. The conflict will, no doubt, be long and protracted. We will suffer more because not even a great power can beat guerrillas. The enemy cannot be seen: he is indigenous to the country. My fear is that we will get bogged down.
War against our own people is too terrible a thing to resort to. Many questions spring to mind. Was the decision to go to war determined by the absence of other viable options? Why was it not debated in parliament? Why deploy military means in pursuit of an indeterminate and primarily political end? Was there a geopolitical imperative to resort to war in Waziristan? Aren't we Pakistanising the American war on our soil?
We must also recognize the limitations of modern, high technology, military equipment in confronting highly motivated guerrilla movement in a treacherous terrain. We must also recognize that the consequences of large-scale military operations – against our own people – particularly in this age of highly sophisticated and destructive weapons – are inherently difficult to predict and control. Therefore, they must be avoided, excepting only when our nation's security is clearly and directly threatened. These are the lessons of history. Pray God we learn them. But as George Bernard Shaw said: "We learn from history that we learn nothing from history."
Courtesy: The News
October 21, 2009
On Saturday last, the army launched an operation, code-named Rah-i-Nijat against Mehsud strongholds in South Waziristan. "Both air and ground troops are taking part", Major General Athar Abbas, Chief of the Inter-Services Public Relation told the journalists. Earlier Army Chief General Kayani briefed the political leadership on the "imperative" of the operation against the Mehsuds. The die is cast. An invisible Rubicon crossed.
With this operation Pakistan is launched on the path to a protracted, inconclusive war in the mountains of Waziristan. The decision to commit our forces to such a war is, in my view, a tragic error. Waziristan may not be Vietnam but it has its own river of history that General Kayani is now stepping into.
Once again, there is a dry wind blowing throughout Waziristan and parched grasses wait the spark. Now that the match is lit, the blaze may spread like wildfire throughout the tribal area. Talking about Waziristan, a Mehsud tribesman told a missionary doctor at Bannu: "When God created the world there were a lot of stones and rocks and other lumber left over which were all dumped down on this frontier".
In the early 1900s, a crusty British general, Andrew Skeen, wrote a guide to military operation in Waziristan. His first piece of advice: "When planning a military expedition into Pashtun tribal areas, the first thing you must plan is your retreat. All expeditions into this area sooner or later end in retreat under fire".
The British decision to send troops into the Khaisora valley in November 1936 which transformed Ipi's agitation into a full scale uprising almost over night and set Waziristan on fire which lasted until after 1947. The British failed to capture Ipi and the campaign had to be called off. The judgment displayed by the British and the poor intelligence upon which they based their decisions were chiefly to blame for the disasters that followed. This was the last major rebellion in Waziristan which stemmed from an abrupt change of policy.
The tribesmen's unrivalled fighting record, their ability to intervene in Afghan affairs and to involve Afghans in their own affairs, were factors ignored by the British that made Waziristan different from other Frontier areas. This disastrous attempt to "pacify" Waziristan was the last of several major incursions into tribal territory during the hundred years of Britain's presence in Northwest India. On each occasion the tribes and the mountains won a strategic victory, despite local tactical reverses, and the bulk of the Indian troops were forced to withdraw back into the plains of the Indus valley. The British soon learned that you can annex land but not people.
When the British left, Pakistan had reason to be glad that it had inherited a secure North West Frontier. In September 1947, Mr. Jinnah took a bold decision to reverse the "pacification" policy, withdrew regular troops from Waziristan and entered into new agreements with the tribes. Cunningham, the new governor of NWFP, appointed by Mr Jinnah was a Frontier expert. His disillusion with the "pacification" policy was complete. "I think that we must now face a complete change of policy. Razmak has been occupied by regular troops for nearly 25 years. Wana for a few years less. The occupation of Waziristan has been a failure. It has not achieved peace or any appreciable economic development. It ties up an unreasonably large number of troops, and for the last 10 years there have been frequent major and minor offenses against the troops." The change in policy produced dramatic results and paid rich dividends.
All this has now changed. Mr Jinnah's Waziristan policy which had stood the test of time has been reversed. Our troops are back in Waziristan. Some time back, the commander of the US led troops in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Borno, let the cat out of the bag when he said that US and Pakistani forces were working together like "hammer and anvil" to trap Osama and Al Qaeda forces along the border".
Those who know the Frontier are deeply concerned. The Pakistan government is playing with fire. By reversing Mr Jinnah's Waziristan policy, at the behest of Americans, it has alienated powerful tribes in Waziristan and unsettled our western border which had remained peaceful for 62 years since the birth of Pakistan.
The nation is beginning to see the rapidly unfurling consequences of General Musharraf's fateful decision to join the "coalition of the coerced". America's dreaded war on terror has indisputably arrived on Pakistan's soil. Pakistan is slipping into anarchy and stands on the brink of civil war. A perfect storm is looming on the horizon.
We have stumbled into a war that we cannot fight and win for the simple reason that we don't seem to realize what guerrilla war is like. We are sending conventional troops to do an unconventional job. I can foresee a perilous voyage. The war in Waziristan cannot be won because it is perceived as the white man's war. It could be won only if perceived by the powerful tribes as Pakistan's own war. That, unfortunately, is not how they perceive this war. The conflict will, no doubt, be long and protracted. We will suffer more because not even a great power can beat guerrillas. The enemy cannot be seen: he is indigenous to the country. My fear is that we will get bogged down.
War against our own people is too terrible a thing to resort to. Many questions spring to mind. Was the decision to go to war determined by the absence of other viable options? Why was it not debated in parliament? Why deploy military means in pursuit of an indeterminate and primarily political end? Was there a geopolitical imperative to resort to war in Waziristan? Aren't we Pakistanising the American war on our soil?
We must also recognize the limitations of modern, high technology, military equipment in confronting highly motivated guerrilla movement in a treacherous terrain. We must also recognize that the consequences of large-scale military operations – against our own people – particularly in this age of highly sophisticated and destructive weapons – are inherently difficult to predict and control. Therefore, they must be avoided, excepting only when our nation's security is clearly and directly threatened. These are the lessons of history. Pray God we learn them. But as George Bernard Shaw said: "We learn from history that we learn nothing from history."
Courtesy: The News
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