The Afghan fallout

Part I
By Dr Maleeha Lodhi

The writer is a former envoy to the US and the UK, and a former editor of The News.
There is a line in Lewis Caroll's Alice in Wonderland which is relevant to the situation in which the US-led coalition finds itself in Afghanistan: "If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there".
The core strategic objective that the US seeks to achieve has been defined by President Obama as: "disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaeda". The question is whether to attain this objective, pursuing other goals are also necessary: fighting the Taliban and "nation building" in Afghanistan.
The choice for the west cannot be between cut and run from Afghanistan and an open-ended military engagement. Both are unfeasible and can be disastrous for the region.
An effort to pull out precipitously from Afghanistan would repeat the epic strategic error of the 1990s when the US abandoned that country to the chaos that in turn nurtured Al-Qaeda. But open-ended military escalation risks trapping the west, in a Vietnam-style quagmire: a war without end and with no guarantee of success.
Pakistan's stability has been gravely undermined by three decades of strife in Afghanistan. The twin blowback from the Soviet invasion 30 years ago and the unintended consequences of the 2001 US military intervention has created unprecedented security, economic and social challenges for Pakistan.
Pakistan's involvement in the long war to roll back the Russian occupation bequeathed a witches brew of problems including militancy and a huge number of refugees, two million of whom remain in Pakistan.
The 2001 intervention fuelled more militancy and ferment in the tribal areas. Installing a government in Kabul dominated by an ethnic minority also had deleterious effects. As the Afghan war was increasingly pushed across the border into Pakistan and Islamabad took action in its frontier regions, militants turned their guns on the Pakistani security forces.
It is easy to understand in this backdrop how militancy on both sides of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is interconnected. But it is also distinct in origin, goals and magnitude.
The conflict is connected first by common bonds of tribe and ethnicity; second, by the broad appeal of ideology; third, by links to Al-Qaeda and four, by the two-way cross border movement of insurgents who provide each other a degree of mutual support.
It is also distinct because; one, the Afghan Taliban is an older and more entrenched phenomenon with an organized command and control structure. Two, the Taliban have geographically a much broader presence in Afghanistan compared to the Pakistani Taliban whose support base is confined to only part of the tribal areas, which together constitute just 3 per cent of the country's territory and represent two per cent of the population. Three, they have greater confidence that they will prevail over a foreign force.
In contrast, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a loose conglomeration of a dozen groups that primarily have local origins, motives, and ambitions. It lacks central command and control. Its core group led by Baitullah Mehsud has suffered a serious reversal by his death and the Pakistan military's aggressive actions to blockade and contain his followers in South Waziristan.
Most importantly public sentiment in Pakistan has turned decisively against the TTP, leaving the organization in a position to launch periodic suicide missions, but not expand its influence. Without public backing the Pakistani Taliban are in no position to extend their sway. But the continuing conflict in Afghanistan provides the TTP with its main motivation and legitimacy among its tribal support base.
Pakistan is in a better position than the coalition forces in Afghanistan to disrupt, contain and ultimately defeat its "Taliban", by building on the success of the recent operation in Swat and the tribal area of Bajaur. Within four months of the military action being launched, the Taliban have been driven out of Malakand and the writ of the government has been re-established.
This shows that Pakistan has the capacity to deal with militancy, but without the compounding complications engendered by the fighting across its border. It underscores the most important lesson of counter insurgency: indigenous forces are better able to undertake successful missions.
On the Afghan side, the US and coalition forces will face greater difficulties against the insurgency especially if the present strategy remain unchanged and when a fraud-stricken Presidential election in Afghanistan has denuded the country of a legitimate government.
One response being proposed in the US to this dire situation is a substantial surge of military forces. But to what end, at what cost and with what chances of success? History shows that the Soviet Union deployed 140,000 troops at the peak of its occupation but failed to defeat the resistance.
If the central objective is to disrupt and defeat Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan's border region can this be achieved through a military escalation? Even if the stated aim is to protect the population, more troops will mean intensified fighting with the Taliban.
But Al Qaeda can only be neutralized in Afghanistan and in the border region with Pakistan if it is rejected by and ejected from the Taliban "sea" in which it survives. This urges a strategy to separate the two movements by military, political and other means. Military escalation will push the two closer and strengthen rather than erode their links.
There are three possible scenarios for what could happen in Afghanistan:
1) Military escalation: This will inevitably be directed at the Taliban and will evoke even more hostility from the country's Pashtun-dominated areas and closer cooperation between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban thereby further impeding the core objective of eliminating Al-Qaeda. Although the Taliban do not represent all Pashtuns, they do exploit Pashtun grievances and use the foreign presence as a recruitment tool.
If history is a guide in this graveyard of empires, a military solution is also unlikely to succeed for several reasons:
i) The enhanced military forces will still be insufficient to 'hold' the countryside: independent estimates suggest that the Taliban now have a permanent presence in over 70 per cent of Afghanistan. If Moscow with 140,000 troops supported by a more professional Afghan army of 100,000 could not succeed against the Mujahideen, why should it be any different now?
ii) Escalation will inevitably lead to mounting European/American casualties, which will erode further public support in the west. The insurgents can absorb higher losses and fight on. Pakistan has incurred 7,500 casualties among its security personnel (dead and injured). Can western forces envision such heavy losses and sustain public support?
iii) The economic cost of the war will also escalate. Will western parliaments pre-occupied with economic recovery agree indefinitely to defray the growing costs of an unending Afghan war?
iv) Escalation will likely intensify rivalries among the neighboring powers in a region where a subterranean competition is already in play. Pakistan's concerns about India's role in Afghanistan are well known.
As for the impact on Pakistan, further military escalation on its border is fraught with great risk. The threat of instability will grow not diminish, for many reasons.
i) It will likely lead to an influx of militants and Al Qaeda fighters into Pakistan and an arms flow from across the border.
ii) Enhance the vulnerability of US-NATO ground supply routes through the country as supply needs will likely double. This will create what military strategists call the "battle of the reverse front". Protecting these supply lines will also over stretch Pakistani troops.
iii) It could lead to an influx of more Afghan refugees which can be especially destabilizing in Balochistan.
iv) A surge in Afghanistan can produce a spike in violent reprisals in mainland Pakistan.
v) Most important, intensified fighting and its fallout, could erode and unravel the fragile political consensus in Pakistan to fight militancy.
This article has been adapted from testimony given by the writer to the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate.
(To be continued)

Part II
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
There are three possible scenarios of what could unfold in Afghanistan. The first scenario is more military escalation by a troop surge being proposed by General Stanley McChrystal, the commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The case he has made is that without a substantial increase in troops and a new strategy, the war in Afghanistan may never be won. But history attests that an effort to principally apply a military solution is unlikely to succeed in what has been called the graveyard of empires.
A second scenario is a unilateral withdrawal by US-NATO forces without a political settlement. This scenario is fraught with great danger and will repeat the historic blunder of the 90s when the West abandoned Afghanistan to the chaos that ultimately turned into a breeding ground for Al Qaeda. Any precipitous pullout will be viewed in the region and beyond as a defeat and will embolden the forces of violent extremism across the world.
Although this scenario is unlikely an alternative to the first approach that is being debated in Washington, the so-called remote-controlled, arms length counter-terrorism strategy: an air war using missiles and predators focused on Al Qaeda. But this would simply be another variation of military escalation with all its attendant risks and limited chances of success. The lesson from the Middle East should not be ignored where the Israeli use of air power to decapitate the Palestinian leadership only fuelled radicalisation and more militancy.
It is necessary to consider a third scenario: one that can pave the way for an indigenous Afghan solution and promote a broad national coalition. This will need a new strategy to pursue a political solution that seeks to integrate into the political process all the excluded Pashtun groups and those Taliban elements that can be de-coupled from Al Qaeda.
President Hamid Karzai as well as American and British military commanders have frequently called for reconciliation efforts but what has been absent is a political framework in which serious negotiations can be pursued and which offers real incentives to the insurgents to abandon violence.
This will ultimately involve negotiations for a progressive reduction of Western forces from Afghanistan in return for the insurgents agreeing to a number of conditions. Fashioning a new political structure, that provides a power-sharing arrangement to bring in under-represented Pashtuns, will help to neutralise the insurgency in southern and eastern Afghanistan.
Even if the central leadership of the Taliban refuse to engage in talks this will offer a concrete way to co-opt and peel away local Taliban commanders. There are indications that the alliance between Al Qaeda and many Taliban elements is fraying. Talks will offer a serious opportunity to test this.
Political engagement, even if it does not at first succeed, will represent a meaningful hearts-and-minds effort that can also help create the conditions to isolate the irreconcilable elements among the Taliban.
A plan of action to achieve such a political solution can involve the following elements: The military should hold ground in defensible military encampments. It should avoid creating pockets of vulnerability that risk higher casualties. This will enable the conduct of talks from a position of some strength. Offensive operations should be restricted except in retaliation/self-defence. It should negotiate reciprocal ceasefires at the local level with different actors including local Taliban commanders. It should restrict airstrikes only to terrorist targets based on verified intelligence; avoid civilian casualties.
On the economic front, there should be focus on economic development and job creation at the local level, building capacities region by region through local communities. As for the political aspect, a national reconciliation initiative should be launched to draw in more Pashtuns in to the political process. Talks should be opened with the insurgents initially indirectly through credible intermediaries. The terms of the dialogue should be set out by asking the various Taliban elements to disavow Al Qaeda, halt hostilities and support development efforts and the build-up of Afghan security forces. This will need to be accompanied by the willingness of US-NATO forces to accept a progressive withdrawal from Afghanistan.
As many Afghan players (political and tribal leaders, local power holders) as possible should be sought out in the reconciliation process. Political parties should be allowed to contest next year's parliamentary elections (banned at present) to ensure that the reconciliation efforts are consolidated. It should be ensured that the expansion of Afghan security forces is not ethnically skewed. At the moment between 60-70 per cent of personnel are non-Pashtuns. A political arrangement that once worked in Afghanistan should be promoted: a loose, decentralised political and administrative order which strikes a balance between and reflects Afghanistan's ethnic composition and protects the rights of all minority groups.
On the regional front, a compact between neighbouring states especially ensuring support from Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia for such a new political order in Afghanistan should be created. A formal accord between Pakistan and Afghanistan that includes Kabul's recognition of the Durand Line should be promoted. And at the international level, a UN/OIC peacekeeping force drawn from Muslim countries to implement an agreement once it is reached should be considered. Achieving this outcome will neither be quick nor easy. But Pakistan's stability will be helped, not hurt, by a progressive, orderly de-escalation in Afghanistan. Pakistan will be able to manage its aftermath as a negotiated end to conflict in Afghanistan will be salutary for its future stability. It will further deflate the ideological appeal and political motivations of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and other militants.
Pakistan's long term stability, however, will depend on a number of other factors in addition to the pre-requisites of political stability and effective governance. Other key determinants include: Financial stabilisation and economic revival. The US-supported IMF injections have led to a modicum of financial stability. But ensuring sustainable growth, adequate job creation, social stability and reversing militancy will require larger infrastructure and social sector investment and trade access for Pakistani products in the US and European markets. Market access through a free trade agreement can help Pakistan become a competitive producer, attract foreign investment and serve as a base for exports to the West.
Public support for security operations against militants should continue and be consolidated. In this context, US drone attacks, tactically regarded as effective, are strategically costly as they erode public support and consensus. The capacity of the state to provide effective governance in the post-conflict regions including Swat should be enhanced. In Pakistan's fragile political situation, US actions should not contribute to the breakdown of the national consensus against violent extremism by escalating demands on Pakistan. Efforts to determine Pakistan's security paradigm and decide on its priorities undermine that consensus.
The heated public debate in Pakistan about the benchmarking of US assistance in the Kerry-Lugar Bill is a reminder of how such intrusive conditionalities cancel the hearts and minds effect, hurt national pride and are perceived as an unacceptable violation of the country's sovereignty. They reinforce the transactional nature of the bilateral relationship that Pakistanis so resent and strengthen rather than break from the paradigm of treating the country as hired help rather than a valued ally. Pakistan's security concerns vis-a-vis India and promoting a peaceful settlement of Kashmir should be promoted.
In conclusion, it should be emphasised that the US and Western ability to isolate and eliminate Al Qaeda and violent extremism in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Arab and Muslim countries will depend critically, not so much on military strength and counter-insurgency strategy, as on the demonstration of the political will and capability to secure just solutions to the conflicts and problems in the Islamic world: the Palestine question, Afghanistan, Kashmir and Iraq.
It is this concrete commitment to justice and genuine economic cooperation in the interest of the poor and deprived in the Muslim world that will succeed in turning the tide against extremism and militancy.
(Concluded)
Oct06,2009
Courtesy: The News