The turning point

By Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

It is encouraging that civilian and military authorities are working together to fight the menace of terrorism. However, counter-terrorism should not degenerate into a stalemate because that would provide an excuse to some people to return to a pro-Taliban disposition
The successful meeting of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan on September 24 and approval of the Kerry-Lugar bill by the US Senate on the same day reflect the growing confidence of the international community in Pakistan’s counter-insurgency operations. All this acknowledges the Pakistani military’s successful operation in the Swat-Malakand area, dislodging the Taliban.
April 2009 can be described as the turning point in Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy. It was in this month that the civilian government and the top brass of the army came to the firm conclusion that the Taliban offensive against the Pakistani state had to be checked through the use of hard power. On April 26, the army initiated the operation in Swat-Malakand that reversed the Taliban tide that had assumed control of most of the area. Local administration was either non-existent or was at the mercy of the Swat Taliban.
This operation was more carefully planned and executed with greater firmness and consistency than was the case during various operations in the tribal areas in 2003-2006. Currently, the army is engaged in counter-insurgency actions in South Waziristan, Khyber and Orakzai agencies. The army and paramilitary have lost over 150 men and officers in these operations since April. The Pakistan Air Force also made useful contributions by targeting Taliban hideouts and training camps, making it possible for the army and paramilitary personnel to pursue ground offensives effectively.
The other positive aspect of the Swat operation relates to the efforts of the provincial and federal governments to care for displaced persons from the Swat-Malakand area. Some friendly countries, voluntary groups from Pakistan and abroad and the United Nations provided assistance to cope with this humanitarian problem. The ordinary people of Mardan and adjoining areas made the most significant contribution, who voluntarily hosted displaced people in their houses.
After the restoration of the civilian authority in the Swat area, the army and civilian authorities returned displaced people to their homes in an orderly manner. The current challenge pertains to reconstruction or restoration of schools, hospitals and public facilities destroyed by the Taliban. This should now be possible as new economic assistance for social development is going to be available to Pakistan in a couple of months. Another challenge is coping with remnants of the Swat Taliban hiding in mountains that occasionally engage in violent activities to harass the people and the government.
The Swat operation enjoyed widespread support in Pakistan. This support increased as the army registered successes. However, Islamic political parties, especially the Jama’at-e Islami, opposed the operation, describing it as the killing of Pakistanis at the behest of the United States, and that the Taliban are friends of Pakistan. They argued that the people who burnt down schools and killed people were not Taliban but agents of India, the United States and Israel posing as the Taliban.
The JI had to dilute its criticism after it realised that the people were not receptive to their criticism. They then shifted their focus of criticism to the American role in Pakistan, hoping that they would muster more support on this issue and embarrass the federal government on this issue if not on the Swat operation.
The counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency policy initiated in April has helped the military in general and the army in particular to partly retrieve its reputation and image that had suffered during the last three years of General Pervez Musharraf’s rule, especially in the course of the lawyers’ movement in 2007 and the second suspension of the constitution in November 2007. This action has also improved Pakistan’s diplomatic clout abroad because it showed the determination and capacity to cope with Pakistan-based terrorist groups.
The April decision of the civilian government and the army top brass to work together against the Taliban and other militant groups was more significant than Pakistan’s decision to join the United States in combating terrorism after 9/11.
Knowing General Zia-ul Haq’s model of US-Pakistan relations after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, Musharraf, after 9/11, agreed to join the US effort against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Musharraf supported the Americans on countering terrorism but continued to maintain links with selected Pakistan-based militant groups and some elements among the Taliban. Pakistan’s security forces arrested around 600 people, including some leading Al Qaeda activists, for their alleged links with that organisation. Action was taken against Pakistani militant groups and the Taliban but enough space was left for them to survive.
The Pakistani government and military authorities were divided on whether these groups were a liability or an asset for Pakistan. Their policy of maintaining links with selected militant groups was also shaped by their fear of the US leaving the region after its main goal was achieved, similar to the US decision to quit the region after the Soviets left Afghanistan. Both the military and the government lacked a shared clarity of purpose when the army resorted to military action from time to time in the tribal areas in 2003-2006.
The change in the disposition of the civilian government and the army top brass occurred in April this year because the Taliban overplayed their hand in 2008-2009, causing strong concern in official and non-official civilian and military circles that these groups wanted to undermine Pakistani state and society.
There were several developments in Swat and elsewhere during February-April 2009 that caused a high degree of insecurity in the society, including destruction of schools; killing of people who defied the Taliban; the video of a girl being flogged in public; the Taliban’s refusal to abide by the agreement with the NWFP government; statements questioning the legitimacy of Pakistan’s constitution and democracy; attempts to control Buner; and vigilantism by pro-Taliban hard-line Islamic activists in some of the major cities, including Lahore, Karachi and Rawalpindi. The threat of their march from Swat-Buner to Islamabad haunted the government and people.
The army has pushed back the Taliban tide in the Swat area. However, the Taliban and their allies remain entrenched in various tribal agencies. If the army cannot quickly dislodge them, it may get entangled in a long drawn out counter-insurgency.
Long inconclusive strife provides an opportunity to Islamic groups to become more active in propaganda against the military. Further, it seems ironic that some retired army and intelligence officers publicly question the rationale of the ongoing security operations in the tribal areas. Some senior officers who served during General Pervez Musharraf’s rule express varying degrees of scepticism, if not outright criticism, of the army’s current disposition on counter-insurgency.
It is encouraging that civilian and military authorities are working together to fight the menace of terrorism. However, counter-terrorism should not degenerate into a stalemate because that would provide an excuse to some people to return to a pro-Taliban disposition and target the army and paramilitary personnel with the same kind of demoralising propaganda that was proliferated in 2003-2006.
Courtesy: Daily Times