Evaluating the Swat test

By Dr Maleeha Lodhi

The writer is a former envoy to the US and the UK, and a former editor of The News
Has the military operation in Swat to regain control of the area delivered a decisive blow to militancy in Malakand? Has it just dispersed or irreversibly weakened the Taliban there? Is it a tactical gain or has it established the basis for a strategic setback for the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), especially at a moment of disarray in the wider movement triggered by the death of its leader, Baitullah Mehsud?
Does this mark a turning point in Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts? Will it have lasting effects? Has the fragile peace in the valley been endangered by recent attacks? Is it sui generis or can lessons learnt be applied elsewhere?
Answers to these questions must await the test of time. The "shape and clear" phase of the operation is almost complete. The intense kinetic mission is over but military action is still underway against sporadic pockets of resistance. The "hold and build" stage is now unfolding. Conclusive judgments therefore are only possible once the stabilisation efforts make more headway.
Counterinsurgency is neither quick nor easy, even when initial gains are encouraging. Lasting effects are contingent on the management of the post-conflict phase now in progress, which is fundamentally about governance capacity. Nevertheless, it is instructive to review what has happened so far.
In the major portion of Swat and Malakand division the Taliban have been driven out and control has been restored. A core goal of the operation to re-establish the state's writ has almost been accomplished within four months of its launch. Over 30,000 troops of three divisions were deployed, all of whom will remain there during the stabilisation phase.
However, as the recent suicide attack in Mingora demonstrated, the militants' capacity to strike still has to be neutralised, even if it has been significantly degraded. That the newly created community police force was targeted also underlined the Taliban's tactics to sow fear, demoralise recruits and raise the costs of local cooperation with the law enforcement authorities (LEAs), which has been so important for the intelligence-based military effort.
Military authorities acknowledge that a guerrilla-style, hit-and-run low-intensity conflict will continue. All the top leaders of the Swat TTP are still at large. sporadic fighting by scattered bands keeps erupting. Army units are said to be conducting search expeditions in the more inaccessible valleys such as Biha and Sakhra. Hardcore fighters who melted into the heavily forested terrain have occasionally engaged the army but in a defensive rather than offensive mode.
This resistance is said to be dwindling, especially as the local community is becoming more assertive in collaborating with the army authorities and trust between them is being rebuilt. More intelligence information is now flowing, although this has to be carefully verified to rule out any settling of local scores.
Official and public confidence has been encouraged by a series of militant surrenders, some to the LEAs and others to officially sponsored local lashkars. But setting too high a store on the people's ability to resist and inform must be tempered by their lingering fear of a Taliban comeback, until at least the top leadership is neutralised.
The most remarkable aspect of the Malakand operation is the return of displaced people. An estimated 1.8 million refugees have returned, 80 per cent back to the division and 90 per cent in Swat, confounding the doomsday predictions of many foreign observers. This would not have happened if they did not feel reassured about their safety. Public concern about the militants will not evaporate overnight, but the return of the IDPs is an important indicator of growing normalcy. Handling the displaced persons was rightly seen as a critical test of the operation. Their swift and largely orderly repatriation marks an important accomplishment.
The exodus of over two million people and the danger of a humanitarian disaster became issues of sharp domestic concern and vocal international criticism. Even though this caused much human suffering, the mass evacuation became the key enabling factor for effective military action, allowing artillery and aerial bombardment of the evacuated areas. It made it easier for the LEAs to distinguish between friend and foe, something the authorities claimed in the past had always created confusion in the mind of the law enforcers.
The Pakistani army seems to have also learnt by doing and honed its counterinsurgency skills. A key role was played by airborne SSG (Special Services Group) units that undertook the biggest such operation in the subcontinent's history. The Pakistan Air Force's ability to launch precision bombings on militant targets was also significant to the overall outcome.
The strategic shift that helped drive the operation was that in public sentiment which swung decisively against the militants and in support of the action. And because the Army leadership did not plan the offensive to be long drawn out it helped sustain public support. This reinforced an indispensable lesson of counterinsurgency: without popular legitimacy and local ownership no military action can be consistently pursued, much less succeed.
The operational plan involved moving into Swat from the surrounding areas as the militants' linkages and hideouts cut across district and divisional boundaries. That is why the offensive started from Dir and Buner with the focus on first tackling militant bases. Clearing Peochar, the hub of the Swat Taliban, marked a critical step.
High fatalities were suffered. To lose so many soldiers and a high proportion of officers had little precedent in any four month counter insurgency mission. The rules of engagement prescribed by the army leadership to avoid collateral damage, in large part, explain this.
In addition to regaining control of the region Operation Rah-e-Rast's accompanying goal has been to restore public confidence in the law enforcement agencies and the civil administration so as to create an environment unfavourable to the free movement of insurgents and inhospitable to the re-emergence of militancy.
Establishing the infrastructure for longer-term stability is fraught with problems and obstacles but is proceeding by building police strength for the NWFP and Swat with 3,000 police personnel under training by the army. Raising a local civilian militia known as the community police force seeks to expand law enforcement responsibilities to local stake holders. Local lashkars, while a useful short-term expedient, raise legal issues in a settled area, apart from being fraught with other risks.
The establishment of this hybrid security arrangement and conclusion of the stabilisation phase will dictate the army's ability to gradually withdraw from the area, leaving behind a permanent garrison.
Just as imposing in the recovery phase are the "build and rehabilitate" challenges which also involve putting in place sustainable local governance and justice systems. The outlook here is uncertain as the civilian complement to the military operation has yet to come into energetic play.
Government control has been re-established and the ingredients of a plan for longer-term stability and security of the region is in hand. But much hard work lies ahead before Swat can be declared a successful enterprise.
As for the Swat action's impact on militancy beyond the region it has put the militants on the defensive, halted their advance and reduced their ability to extend the war outside the NWFP. A political climate has been created that is more favourable to conduct counter militancy policies.
This doesn't by any means imply that the threat of militancy is over. The factors that fuel that threat and determine the fate of the TTP go way beyond Swat and are inextricably linked to the instability in Afghanistan which is worsening rather than showing any sign of ending.
Sep08,2009
Courtesy: The News