Terrorist surge and its implications

TARIQ OSMAN HYDER
October 21, 2009

There has been a surge of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The most audacious being the precision assault on the headquarters of the Pakistan Army followed by the coordinated triple attack on FIA and Police establishments in Lahore, accompanied by daily bomb blasts. The army is now a major target after its largely successful operation in Swat and because of a major offensive under way in South Waziristan, followed by the FIA and Police. The Swat operation was a milestone in the counter terrorism campaign. It was made possible only by the build-up of public, political and media support, on which the sustainability of the effort depends.
For the outside world and Pakistan this spate of attacks raises a number of questions. Is the security situation deteriorating and will the military, paramilitary and police forces be put on the defensive with heightened public insecurity eroding public morale? What response strategy can deliver? The US media has criticised the army's security for not stopping the attack at the outermost security cordon perimeter. This critique implies that the military's capacity in the counter terrorism campaign depends in significant part on the controversial Kerry-Lugar assistance legislation.
To analyse what the present situation portends one must view this struggle between the forces for a progressive Pakistan and the militants' vision of a theocratic Pakistan in the context of national dynamics, regional and international parallels and of the timescale and resources required to win this battle for the soul of Pakistan.
As far as the Pakistan Army is concerned, while lessons should be learnt, the attack on its HQ was contained and took time to end because of the hostages. America, the most advanced country in the world was unable to prevent 9/11. The Mumbai attack virtually took another metropolis hostage. Despite massive military and monetary intervention in Iraq, the security situation has forced America into an exit strategy. While even more resources and troops are being poured into Afghanistan, attacks against civilians and the military are far higher than in Pakistan with its eleven times larger population.
Pakistan, like most developing countries and Muslim countries, is a fractured society with significant gaps between haves and have-nots. Developmental efforts have not been well planned or competently administered due to the lack of political stability or good governance and deteriorating state institutions. The hegemonistic ambitions of India and its unwillingness to move on the Kashmir dispute necessitated large defence expenditures. The erosion of the government's public education system has divided the youth into three streams: those attending private schools who reap the opportunities; those going to government schools who are at a grave disadvantage; and the resourceless multitude attending the madrassahs, which had a revered place in Muslim education, but since the American sponsored Afghan Jihad have become the driving force for discontented youth.
The battle against the militants has become multi-dimensional. In border regions, military counter insurgency coupled with re-establishing administration and development will predominate. In settled areas, urban warfare with the terrorists using asymmetrical acts of explosive violence and precision attacks against the symbols of the state will have to be dealt with through different tactics including better intelligence gathering and coordination to more aggressively utilising existing military and civil resources.
The strength of the militants and their access to arms from Afghanistan is dependent on funding. Some comes from drug money and hostile intelligence agencies across the border. A small part is raised within Pakistan. However the largest amount is received by transfers using both banking and illegal channels. This is borne out by the fact that while from documented remittance flows some seven billion dollars a year comes from overseas workers, a grey area of four million dollars comes ostensibly for charitable, educational and other purposes from other parties. Pakistan must forcibly address this problem with known conduit countries and by activating its investigative and regulatory mechanisms, including the State Bank's Financial Investigation Unit and the FIA. Certainly, the United States has the muscle to do more on this vital external funding front.
It will take five to 10 years to defeat the militant threat. The East Punjab insurgency in a far smaller area took 10 years to overcome, the LTTE 30 years. It will take a generation to reverse causational social conditions. That is the scale on which to assess whether or not the security situation in Pakistan is deteriorating. The militants have been hard hit and are fighting back to break the public and governmental resolve. Continued military operations in South Waziristan and elsewhere will lead to increased terrorist attacks, but the losses they inflict should be far less than what is meted out to them.
While democracy must be strengthened, the army remains the strongest and most cohesive force in Pakistan which can tackle the terrorist threat. However, its counterinsurgency and surveillance capabilities must be improved. Equally important, socio-economic development has to be accelerated.
The now passed Kerry-Lugar Bill contains clauses detrimental to Pakistan's self-respect which should have been modified. However, the controversy missed the main point that if America and its Western allies are serious about defeating terrorism the assistance must be at least three to five times more in order to help Pakistan overcome this threat, part of a global terrorist network strengthened by their occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Pakistan must also diversify incoming assistance, lessen dependence on American military assistance, expand and add value to its exports to generate its own resources. Our window of vulnerability lies in our deficit balance of payments, between what we earn and what we spend, which necessitates external assistance from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and bilateral sources with inevitable conditionalities, which circumscribes our freedom of manoeuvre and policy choices.
Without adequate multinational economic and military equipment support and also action by the Extra Regional Forces to control the border from the Afghan side, the battle in Pakistan will take far longer. It is also in India's interest to live up to its declared objective of wanting good relations with a stable Pakistan. Certainly, if there is evidence to the contrary it must be made public by our government.
The writer is a retired Pakistani diplomat.
Courtesy: The Nation