Dilemmas of expanding the war

By Dr Maleeha Lodhi

The decision to launch a military operation against Baitullah Mehsud, the powerful leader of the Pakistani Taliban, comes as no surprise. The announcement to extend the war to South Waziristan on the back of an effective two-month old military offensive in Swat seems to reflect a calculation that this is the most opportune moment to strike at the strategic centre of gravity of the Taliban threat to the country.
But opening a new front while the Swat operation is still in progress will pose tough challenges including the danger of military overstretch.
The operation will also test the army's preparedness to negotiate much tougher terrain and confront more hardened insurgents, factors that in past operations have trumped the military's principally conventional fighting skills. The risk that the new offensive could compound the refugee crisis will also have to be managed and minimised.
In an unusual announcement on Sunday, the governor of NWFP, Awais Ahmed Ghani said that a "comprehensive operation" would soon be undertaken in South Waziristan. The details of this operation would be determined by the army. Accusing Baitullah Mehsud of providing sanctuary to anti-Pakistan terrorists and foreign fighters, training suicide bombers and killing innocent people, the governor declared that this left the government with no option but to flush out the Taliban from the tribal areas.
Even before the governor's announcement there were growing indications of an expanding operation as military forces moved days before to establish control of the entry and exit points from South Waziristan. Last Saturday an air strike on Mukeen village, known to be a Mehsud stronghold, reportedly destroyed two compounds used for terrorist training.
This indicated preparatory actions to take on Mehsud's fighters and soften up their positions. These manoeuvres seemed aimed at containing Baitullah Mehsud in his redoubt by seizing control of the supply lines into his base of operation. A strategy to militarily "choke" the leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) seemed to have been in play weeks before the announcement to pursue a full fledged operation. These "chocking" moves have sought to confine Mehsud to his bastion while engaging his militant supporters in theatres beyond South Waziristan.
Sandwiched between the Waziri tribes in the south and north, Baitullah is said to be in a potentially vulnerable position, even as he has, over the past several months, been activating a loose but formidable network of supporters and teaming up with breakaway groups of Punjab-based jihadi organizations to spread mayhem across the country.
The decision to take the fight to Waziristan has come in the wake of a mounting reign of terror unleashed by militants. Violence last week included the high-profile assassination of Allama Sarfraz Naeemi, an outspoken critic of the Taliban, and the targeting of foreign workers associated with the international humanitarian effort.
The June 9 and 11 attacks on the Peshawar Pearl Continental and mosques in Nowshera and Lahore respectively took violence, that surged in the past month, to a new peak. Since May 27 over a hundred people have been killed in a series of terrorist incidents. The first six months of 2009 may turn out to be the country's bloodiest ever, surpassing the violence in the comparable period of 2008, a year that saw a record number of suicide bombings, IED explosions, kidnappings and casualties in terrorist attacks.
The spate of terrorist bombings, for which the TTP claimed responsibility was but the latest surge in violence directed by its top commander in response to the Swat operation. These counter assaults raised the stakes by not just taking the war into the cities but widening it by striking out at new targets, including the moderate ulema who had vociferously denounced the Taliban's activities and judged them as a stigma on Islam. The aim was to intimidate and silence those who could drain away political and ideological support for the militants.
The role of the Barelvi clergy especially Allama Naeemi, in helping to transform the public view of the Taliban from a political actor to a criminal one, had been crucial. Dr Naeemi's killing marked a dangerous new trend as it was intended as a warning to any prominent cleric who opposed the Taliban. Allama Naeemi had emerged as a potent symbol of religious resistance to the Taliban, a mission that his son has now vowed to carry on.
The Taliban leadership was also seeking to disrupt the humanitarian enterprise in a vain effort to impede relief for people displaced by the fighting .The aim was clearly to sow discord and shift the public mood against the military operation.
These multi-pronged tactics seemed designed to relieve increasing pressure on Baitullah Mehsud, and spread fear and confusion to wear down the public will to weather the attacks. But these tactics seemed to backfire as the intensified wave of bombings fuelled public anger and reinforced the antipathy for the Taliban. In Lahore, for example, enraged crowds marched in protest in the immediate aftermath of Allama Neemi's killing chanting "death to the Taliban".
If the Taliban's aim in raising the stakes was to deter any military assault to dislodge Baitullah Mehsud from his stronghold, the escalation had a completely opposite effect, reinforcing the resolve of the authorities to pursue action against him and his associates.
Expanding the military offensive on the heels of a so far effective but ongoing Swat operation holds both risks and opportunities. The biggest risk in engaging on multiple fronts is that of military over stretch. Swat has yet to be fully secured and stabilised when another front is to be opened. Bajaur is also not entirely under control while restiveness in Mohmand Agency continues to pose a challenge. In this backdrop pursuing a new offensive could strain the army's resources and morale.
Opening a new theatre of combat also risks another influx of refugees at a time when the government is struggling to manage the relief and rehabilitation operation for the two million displaced people of Swat. Additional disruption will present an added challenge to the onerous task of putting in place efficient arrangements for the orderly and safe repatriation of Swat's displaced residents.
Moreover the challenges of a full-fledged operation in South Waziristan are fundamentally different from one in a settled area like Swat. This relates as much to the huge differences in terrain, location, and infrastructure, as to issues of logistical vulnerability and constraints on mobility and the vastly different political and tribal environment. Neutralizing the militant power symbolized by a man with whom two peace deals were forged in the past will be a formidable task, fraught with all the risks posed by a challenging environment.
Against these risks the military momentum attained by the operation in Swat and before that in Bajaur, offers opportunities to leverage this in the most crucial battleground. Improved tactics, higher morale and greater confidence to fight insurgency are all important elements of this military momentum.
As important is the momentum of public opinion. The public support that has been building up for a decisive crackdown on militants provides a crucial enabling political environment to expand the military operation.
Capitalising on these advantageous factors while minimising the awesome number of risks will require a coherent plan and well-thought out strategy. It will also require implementation of this strategy in accordance with a time table drawn up by the military and not one dictated by the militants, whose aim may well be to lure the army into a premature engagement.
This strategy will also have to address the deficits of previous operations including last year's military foray into South Waziristan. It was claimed after that operation that the TTP leader had been marginalized when the reality subsequently indicated otherwise. Factoring into future strategy the lessons learnt from past mistakes is the only way to avoid repeating them.
The fate of the Taliban may well rest on the outcome of the new offensive planned for South Waziristan as well as on the successful conclusion of the Swat operation, measured as much in political and humanitarian terms as in its military dimensions. An ill-planned intervention in the tribal areas can unravel the gains in Swat. The stakes could not be higher. Meeting the heightened challenge to the country's security may depend on how multiple military engagements are pursued and on their crucial political aftermath.
June 16,2009
Courtesy: The News