Pakistan: countering insurgency?

Mushfiq Murshed
The suicide attack on October 04 in the World Food Programme Office in Islamabad took five lives. The subsequent warning by the Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, that similar attacks should be expected in the near future is contrary to his earlier statement that the military operation in FATA has broken the backbone of the Taliban insurgency.
The aftermath of this particular suicide attack shows the effectiveness of the Taliban strategy. Fear has gripped the country, once again, and the United Nations has closed its offices nationwide for an indefinite duration.
Conversely, the success of the military operations in FATA and the Malakand Division cannot be denied. However, this one-dimensional reactive strategy, although necessary, will not be sufficient. The Pakistani government and the armed forces have concentrated their efforts on the factions that have posed a direct and immediate threat to the sovereignty and security of the country. The remaining militants continue business-as-usual.
As the insurgency in Afghanistan spreads to the North of the Hindu Kush and Taliban activity intensifies, the US and ISAF, in turn, have also intensified pressure on Pakistan by blaming the latter for their somewhat failing Afghan strategy. These allegations, unfortunately, are not mere speculations.
Their latest accusation has been that the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), which is considered as the biggest threat to counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan is being led by Mullah Omar who is also said to be residing in the city along with other influential leaders of his faction.
A case could be put forward that the Pakistan Army does not have the necessary resources and capability to tackle militants in multiple fronts, as the country requires an effective military presence on its eastern borders as well. However, the Indian threat is no longer restricted to the eastern border. Some feel that it is India’s heightened presence in Afghanistan and perceived intervention in the Balochistan insurgency that has prompted Pakistan to revive its strategic depth strategy through surreptitious assistance to the Afghan Taliban.
The US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, addressed this issue in an assessment that was sent to US Defense Secretary Gates. He observed: “Increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan and India.” The establishment of India’s first foreign military base in Farkhor, Tajikistan, has further intensified the mistrust.
Islamabad, however, cannot afford to revert to its previously failed strategy of strategic depth for which it will, once again, require the cooperation of non-state actors. These issues need to be addressed diplomatically and international pressure, primarily from the US, needs to be asserted for India to rollback its presence from the area, re-engage Pakistan through composite dialogue and de-escalate tensions so that Pakistan may concentrate more of its resources and energy in the war against militancy.
Meanwhile, a more comprehensive strategy has to be developed in Pakistan to target the multiple factions of militants operating in the country, irrespective of whether the latter’s perceived agenda is a direct threat or not to the former. They are all intertwined through an intricate network where funds, ammunition and soldiers flow freely from one faction to another.
Various militant offshoots are scattered throughout the country. No province or city is immune from their influence, however, Punjab is faced with the most immediate and ominous threat. It is predicted that the next big insurgency emanating from the south of Punjab, where according to some estimates, their numbers have risen to approximately 100,000, will be far more devastating than the present scenario due to their proximity to urban cities. At the moment, security forces at the disposal of any provincial administration are incapable of tackling such a formidable opponent.
Intelligence and pre-emptive strikes are the appropriate counterinsurgency strategies to apply before these movements gather a momentum that can only be stopped through military intervention and possible urban warfare. For this the security forces within the provinces need to be enhanced through training, recruitment and provision of resources.
Furthermore, a workable inter-provincial and centre partnership strategy to counter insurgencies and terrorism needs to be devised and implemented. A unanimous nationwide consensus against militancy in Pakistan was reached after the capitulation of Swat and the misery that millions of IDPs faced in mismanaged camps. Unfortunately, despite this consensus, petty politicking, personal agendas and inter-provincial mistrust have presented roadblocks in establishing a coordinated and unified strategy. The subsequent vacuum has provided the militants space and time to plan and orchestrate their terrorist attacks of which, the WFP office is just a prelude.
The writer is the editor-in-chief of Criterion Quarterly.
Courtesy: The Nation