New face of Talibanisation

By Faizullah Jan
24 Oct, 2009

AS the state machinery took its time before launching the operation in Waziristan, the Taliban outflanked it by launching an offensive of their own, bringing the war to the heartland of the country.
After taking on GHQ, the proverbial nerve centre, they have shown a change in the tactics of terror: the militants’ attacks have now metamorphosed into a full-blown urban war.
The brazen attack on GHQ, which was quickly followed by three synchronised raids on security establishments in Lahore, is a change in the tactics of the Taliban. Until recently they would attack military convoys with improvised devices or their frenzied cadres would blow themselves up near a target or in a crowd. Now they have descended from the hills of Waziristan (as the common understanding goes) to extend the theatre of war. It will divide the focus of the armed forces and put many people’s lives at risk.
The day GHQ was attacked two words seemed to stick out in the local and international media: brazen and audacious. But there is more to it than merely an attack by the Taliban who have challenged the writ of the state everywhere and at will. No less than six terrorist attacks in Punjab — one targeting the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, another the Manawan police academy, the GHQ assault in Rawalpindi and three synchronised attacks against security establishments, including Manawan once more, in Lahore — bear the hallmark of militants other than the Taliban of Waziristan.
According to the New York Times, these attacks showed the deepening reach of the militant network, as well as its rising sophistication and inside knowledge of the security forces. These attacks are enough to jolt the country’s establishment out of its belief that nothing is brewing in the backyard of Punjab. The sophisticated attacks across the Indus highlight a stark reality: the phenomenon of the Taliban is not ethnic, but a national one. The most alarming aspect of this saga is that militants belonging to sectarian terror outfits have been in the forefront of these attacks.
The mastermind of the GHQ attack, Aqeel, has been associated with Lashkar-i-Jhangvi — a sectarian terror group active in Punjab since long. He was also allegedly involved in the terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team. It shows how dangerously these sectarian groups have, over the years, transformed into a force capable of taking on the state.
The southern part of Punjab shares many things with the tribal areas of the NWFP. If the century-old Frontier Crimes Regulation had imposed maliks on the common tribesmen for their control and exploitation, feudalism has sucked the life out of the common Punjabi. Exploitation and alienation is on the same level in Fata and southern Punjab, which gives common cause to the Taliban and the sectarian groups to team up against an identical enemy — the FCR in the tribal areas and feudalism in Punjab.
Things went awry when the state started patronising such organisations, which played on the inherent contradictions in society. The state wanted to privatise Kashmir and the Afghan war, but little did it know that one day the militants could turn their guns on it. The whole of the NWFP in general and Peshawar in particular had been the staging post for the so-called Afghan jihad for no less than 10 years, which is enough time to contaminate the local cultural and religious ethos. Besides, given poor economic indicators, state patronage of militancy and its long porous border with Afghanistan, the NWFP was bound to be the breeding ground for obscurantist forces like the Taliban.
When inculcating ‘jihad’ became the state policy during Gen Ziaul Haq’s dark rule and ‘jihad fi sabeelillah’ became the motto of the armed forces, the first seed of Talibanisation was sown. Genuine political leadership was banished from the country while political activity was stifled. The vacuum was then filled by sectarian and linguistic groups which left the social fabric in tatters. People started seeking identity in narrow ‘ideologies’ in the absence of national parties that could give representation to everyone.
Public display of ostentatious religiosity became the norm with small militant outfits becoming an extension of the state’s foreign policy, while mainstream leaders — including nationalists — were branded as traitors, corrupt and inept. Religious vigilantes started stalking every segment of society, especially campuses. Conformity replaced diversity of opinion; anyone falling on the wrong side of the establishment was either chased out or condemned to silence.
After years of mayhem in Afghanistan the Taliban emerged victorious, in the process attracting jihadis of every hue to the country. For the first time sectarian militants found a safe haven in Afghanistan after spilling a lot of blood in Pakistan. When the Taliban took over Kabul, it bolstered the many obscurantist factions in Pakistan. However, when the Taliban were toppled by the US after 9/11 and found sanctuary in the tribal badlands of Pakistan, a local version of the extremist militia emerged to challenge the writ of the government in the name of the Sharia.
The sectarian groups of Punjab found an ally in Fata.
The rot does not lie only in the tribal areas. While they provide sanctuary to every group that challenges the writ of the state, they have their own grievances. They may fly in the same flock but they are not birds of a feather. Once done with Waziristan the state’s focus should turn to Punjab, where sleeper cells are not sleeping anymore. This should be done before southern Punjab becomes another Swat.
Sectarian crimes accentuated by economic deprivation and socio-cultural contradictions have clothed themselves in petty identities. In the short term they need to be removed physically; in the long term the inherent contradictions have to be addressed, for which drastic steps have to be taken.
Courtesy: Dawn

Implications of the Waziristan operation

Shafqat Mahmood
October 23, 2009

The mother of all battles it may not be, but success of the Waziristan operation is critical to the fight against militancy in Pakistan. It is the last frontier, an un-policed border land, a black hole in sovereign territory that has become a centre of terror. Without taking control of it, victory in Pakistan's terror war is impossible.
The fighting is tough as was to be expected but in the end, superior force will prevail. Pakistani armed forces will eventually control South Waziristan physically.
This will not be a small achievement because it is the hardest place to fight. Through the ages, every invader of the subcontinent from the north felt its heat and the super power of the 19th century, the British, also were terribly bogged down. If successful, the Pakistan Army will achieve what others were unable too.
While it is true that in this kind of war, occupation of physical space is only a small part of the equation. It is also possible that most of the militants may filter out to Afghanistan or other parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Yet, South Waziristan is one place where taking control of territory is important.
Its space is being used as a sanctuary by Al Qaeda and other foreign militants, particularly Uzbeks. It has training schools for planning and execution of terror attacks. It is used for fabrication of terror material and for the production of suicide bombers. It is also a refuge for radical groups from Punjab and criminals of all kinds. Losing this area will be a setback to militancy.
Militants will regroup and strike in other places. No one has any illusions that this is a short war. But, bit by bit, the freedom for terrorists to operate has to be reduced. It was done in Swat and other parts of Malakand and though incidents continue to happen, the terrorists are on the run there and their ability to strike is reduced.
Hopefully, this will be the result too after the success of the Waziristan operation. The terrorist will have to find new places to regroup and it will not be easy. The only problem is that the American angle has become murky at least in the media.
On the day that American generals, Patreaus and McChrystal arrived in Islamabad, there were stories in all the papers that American forces have removed their check posts on Afghan side of the border. The implications of this are quite alarming. If true, not only would this allow the South Waziristan militants to flee to Afghanistan, it would also potentially make it easier for the Afghan Taliban to join the fight against Pakistan Army.
This story died as quickly as it surfaced but it raised intriguing possibilities. What were the Americans up to? The general assumption is that the South Waziristan operation has been coordinated with NATO/American forces in Afghanistan to the extent that they would play their role on the Afghan side to interdict any cross-border movement of militants from this side. Is this not the case?
These two are closely aligned to the Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban; who are a dominant force in the adjoining Afghan province.
This would suggest that at least this faction of the Afghan Taliban has no interest in fighting the Pakistan Army and it may have advised its local acolytes not to do so. If this is indeed the case, it is unlikely that Afghan Taliban in the region, which is the Haqqani group, would join the South Waziristan militants in the fight.
If it does pan out in this way, a wedge that is already visible between the Mehsud/South Waziristan militants and at least a faction of the Afghan Taliban will be further widened. It also means that their partners including Al Qaeda elements, fighters from foreign countries, Punjab-based militants, insurgents in Swat and other parts of the NWFP, will all have a reason to be alienated from at least the Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban.
The Haqqani group is a significant presence among the Afghan Taliban. Does this mean that stories implying Mullah Omar and the Afghan Taliban are not opposed to Pakistan and have no interest in supporting the Pakistani militancy, are true? And if so, is this the reason that the Americans are cheesed off?
Alternately, if at some stage Gul Bahadur and Nazir do change their stance or, the Afghan Taliban join the fight against the Pakistan Army, will this create an unbridgeable gulf between the two and lead to a greater impetus in hunting down Taliban leadership in Pakistan?
The Americans seem to be willing this to happen. The repeated drone attacks in North Waziristan in the past greatly angered the Gul Bahadur/Nazir faction. This did create a wedge between them and the Pakistani Army and led to an unexpected attack in the North some weeks ago that inflicted heavy casualties. Pakistan army leadership displayed a great deal of patience and no retaliatory attacks were launched. This has paid off in the truce that is visible now.
The future of Pak American cooperation on the military side depends on the decision made by President Obama regarding Afghanistan. If there is a huge surge and an all-out assault is launched on the Afghan Taliban, there is bound to be tension between the Pakistani military and American/NATO forces in Afghanistan.
This will be for two reasons. One, the Americans will continue to accuse Pakistani military of providing sanctuary to Afghan Taliban leadership in Quetta. Since the war in Afghanistan is not easy and a surge will not bring victory, the scapegoat will be Pakistan providing sanctuary to the Taliban.
Secondly, and hopefully it would not come to that, there would be pressure in the US to attack so called Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, from the air and even on ground. This will have truly horrendous consequences and lead to so much anger in Pakistan, that it will make any Pak-American cooperation in the war on terror very difficult, if not impossible.
If on the other hand, Obama decides to indentify Al Qaeda as the real enemy and open negotiations with the Afghan Taliban, it will change the scenario completely. It is an outcome that Pakistani strategist have been advocating and will allow both countries to focus their effort in removing Al Qaeda and its partners from this region.
It will also allow for a more focused broad based fight against militancy in Pakistan, where American assistance both military and non-military would be very effective. The Pakistani federal cabinet has, as predicted, accepted the fig leaf offered by the explanatory statement to the Kerry-Lugar Bill. The aid can start flowing. But, its future depends on how the situation unfolds on the military front both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Courtesy: The News

Our Af-Pak Strategy for Peace

by General Mirza Aslam Beg

The Afpak region is in a state of flux, yet it presents tremendous opportunities for diplomacy to operate and establish peace in the region. The real change has occurred in Afghanistan, after the invasion by the Soviets, and the follow up events which disturbed the peace of the world and now has reached a boiling point, where the “bubble must burst,” giving way to new realities and a new paradigm of peace in the region, and beyond. President Obama’s Afpak strategy has failed and therefore “there ought to be an exit strategy for Afghanistan.” How? That is the dilemma!!

The American and the NATO allies have lost their nerves and want to exit from Afghanistan, at the earliest. The only country, which can provide a safe exit, it is Pakistan and the only people, who can guarantee such exit, are the Taliban – the winners. The Indians who were brought into the foray, as part of the strategic alliance – “to contain and curb the rising power of China and Islamic Extremism” have proved a disappointment for the Americans. The Indians, therefore have been warned to restrain themselves, yet they may try their best to retain their influence in Afghanistan, once the exit begins.

The Taliban of today, were the Mujahideen of the 80’s, fighting against the Soviets, who were defeated and forced to withdraw. Thus the American objectives having been served, the Mujahideen became irrelevant and were denied their share in power, they had won. They were degraded by calling them ‘extremists and fundamentalists’ and were made to fight amongst themselves. After 9/11, Afghanistan was occupied and the ‘war on terror’ was launched against the Afghans, fighting for their freedom, called Taliban. The hardcore of Taliban is the young generation which was born thirty/twenty five years back and has grown under the shadows of war. Their only objective in life is to win their freedom. They have never involved themselves, outside Afghanistan. They have no truck with Al-Qaeda except the 005 Al-Qaeda Brigade, numbering about 3000, which has recently joined the Shadow Army under Mulla Umar. The Taliban, have never fired a bullet against the Pakistani security forces. In fact when tension mounted between Pakistani security forces and Baitullah Masud, Taliban sent a powerful, nine member delegation, advising Baitullah Masud, to talk and negotiate peace, but he did not listen. It is therefore evident, that the so called Pakistani Taliban are a different entity altogether, whereas the Afghan Taliban are the arbiters of the destiny of the people of Afghanistan. And rightly the Americans have already developed contact with them, who are demanding a “time-frame for withdrawal” as the pre-condition. Both, the USA and Pakistan, therefore need to support the Taliban, and not to let them be cheated of their right to form the government, as it happened in 1990. They are the winners and deserve their due place in power sharing. Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, therefore, is important - the diplomatic, political and military support - as much as for the Americans, for their safe exit.

The Europeans and the Americans have burdened Obama, with the Nobel Peace Prize, which he didn’t deserve, but the award puts moral and psychological pressure on him to perform and find peace in Afghanistan – some thing Pakistan should whole heartedly welcome. One of the declared objective of Obama therefore, is to bolster Pakistan, militarily and economically, so that Pakistan could play the desired role, to provide the safe exit as well as protect their interests in the region. In protecting American interests we have to be very discreet and mindful as not to provide the Safe Haven to them in Pakistan. The increasing number of secret agencies such as Black water, DynCorp and others, which have found space in Pakistan, are dangerous indications. Kerry Lugar bill, and the explanatory notes of individuals, like Kerry and Berman, that “there is no intention to micro-manage internal Pakistani affairs,” holds no bar on the bill, which has become law under Obama’s signature. American law cannot be over-ruled by individual undertakings, except by another law.

Pakistan has a pivotal role to play in exercise of this option. Any other option would mess-up the whole situation. Therefore, looking dispassionately at the responsibility placed on Pakistan, the following could be the steps to play its role: Improve relations with the Taliban and reestablish the past goodwill. Mainly diplomatic and political initiatives are to be undertaken and ‘no cloak and dagger activities of the intelligence agencies.’ The Indian negative influences in Afghanistan must be challenged to avoid the two-front war situation, we are facing now.The Taliban will not allow to be cheated this time of their right to form the government, being in the majority. Some neighbours of Afghanistan in particular must be kept at a distance, because, in the past, they played very negative role in the establishment of a broad-based government in Afghanistan.Pakhtunistan has emerged as a reality. There are over three million of them in Karachi – the economic support base – and their power extends to Balochistan, NWFP and to the Hindukush Mountains. Their fight for freedom, since 1980, has galvanized them into a formidable force, combining the forces of Pakhtun Nationalism, Islamic Idealism (Jehad) and Universalism of the Islamic Resistance against oppression, with its hard core, resting along the Durand Line. Pakhtuns are our strength, as much as they are the strength of Afghanistan, as well as a very important element of our foreign policy. During the last military regime, our relations with the Pakhtuns were tarnished, which must be repaired now to the level to provide the foundation for the formation of the Union of three countries – Pakistan - Afghanistan and Iran, to give the much needed “Strategic Depth” to the region. Our relations with China are the bed-rock of our foreign policy. China must be taken, as a friend, hand-in-hand to undertake diplomatic initiatives, as the fleeting moments of opportunity appear, which we must seize to make the best of them.

India would act like a wounded python after meeting set-backs in Afghanistan and would flex its military muscles to frighten Pakistan and intimidate, by acts of terror and actions, such as stopping the fresh water of the rivers, flowing into Pakistan. We have to take these provocations coolly; ready to challenge India, in our own time. Diplomatic and political maneuvers are essential, whereas the military strategy must be based on the principles of ‘asymmetric war’, of the present day times, where ‘men and missiles’ have emerged victorious on the battlefields of Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan, against the most powerful countries, equipped with the best of technologies. Thus, there is a big role, for the Pakhtun Power, in our future conflict with India, to decide once for all the issue of Kashmir.

We have to play a very aggressive diplomatic and political role, to help Afghanistan find peace. Essentially the steps that need to be taken, to achieve the objectives are:

Occupation forces to give a time-frame for withdrawal and declare a cease-fire. Start dialogue with the Taliban and Northern Alliance, to form the Loe Jirga, to decide the main issues, such as:

Formation of the Interim government for a period of three years; holding of the Census; framing of a Constitution; rebuilding of Institutions; massive reconstruction of the infrastructure and re-create ethnic balance, which has been disturbed since the Bonn Conference of 2001.

Hold elections in the year 2013.

Such are the opportunities and the challenges demanding correct and timely responses, to establish the foundation for peace, in the Afpak region, and extend it beyond to other regions. This can be achieved only with the cooperation of all our neighbours and friends, working on the golden principles of “Peace, Cooperation and Engagement,” as propounded and practiced by China. No doubt “Now is the time for all of us to take our share of responsibility for a global response, to global challenges.” Roger Cohen. Martin Luther King very rightly said: “He, who passively accepts evil is as much involved in it as he who help to perpetrate it.” And ‘Mother of all Evil’, is occupation of Afghanistan. When evil is removed, peace would prevail.

Courtesy: Opinion-maker

Operation launched in Waziristan

By Ikramullah
October 21, 2009

The green signal by the Government of Pakistan has finally been given to the armed forces. The internal and external challenges, involving, besides many other factors, had created such a critical situation, culminating in a national security crisis, that hardly any other option was left before the government. The federal government, led by the Pakistan Peoples’ Party, could not possibly take such a decision without taking all the major political forces in confidence, both inside and outside the Parliament. Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, who had just returned from China, rose to the occasion and called the civil and military leadership of Pakistan on Friday morning (October 16), for a joint meeting to make the momentous decision at this critical juncture of Pakistan’s history. Before presiding over the roundtable conference, Prime Minister Gilani called on President Asif Ali Zardari at Aiwan-E-Sadr in Islamabad to apprise him of the challenges facing the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. And also about his proposed strategy to deal with the alarming threat posed by the new wave of terrorism spreading like fire, engulfing the major cities including Islamabad, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Kohat and Peshawar. I believe that time has come to rise above party politics and face the stark reality - Pakistan’s survival is at stake.
The Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani along with his top operational and intelligence chiefs had been specially invited to this crucial meeting. Besides them, leaders of different political parties including Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, Asfandyar Wali Khan, Mian Shahbaz Sharif, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, Dr Farooq Sattar, Senator Israrullah Zehri, Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, and other senior government official were also present during the meeting, in order to take the nation into confidence through their elected representatives. Undoubtedly, the credit for managing to get together this rare galaxy of political leadership at a short notice goes not only to Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s leadership but also the patriotism of the national leadership that rose to the occasion recognising the grave threat to the very existence of the state. I stress this point because in this demonstration of national unity lies the strength of our nation.
The political leadership of Pakistan has entrusted to the armed forces the arduous task of safeguarding the territorial integrity. There was free discussion over nuts and bolts of the planned offensive in Waziristan including internally displaced persons and their management as undertaken by the joint efforts of the civil and military authorities during the Swat and Malakand Operation. Lt Gen Nadeem Ahmad, who had taken care of the IDPs from Swat and their safe return to their homes, was also present in the Prime Minister’s meeting indicating the details covered during the four hour long meeting. The political leadership representing the Pakistani nation is believed to have not only granted unanimous approval of the likely operation in Waziristan but assured full support to the armed forces in this extremely difficult venture in a difficult terrain during the coming winter. It is believed that soon after the green signal from the government, the army has now swung into action in South Waziristan with imposition of curfew in different areas from early morning on October 17. The operation is likely to end successfully and hopefully before the start of the New Year. It is estimated that over a lac and quarter population is likely to be evacuated to safer areas in NWFP, Punjab and Balochistan. The army is likely to place the entire area of South Waziristan under surveillance in order to prevent any outside intervention in the operational area. This has put the government as well as the armed forces under the most critical test since the birth of Pakistan. To come out victorious the armed forces will need undivided and total support of the entire nation. I am confident the nation shall not fail in its duty and shall adhere to “Unity Faith and Discipline”, the call of the Founder of the nation Quaid-i-Azam at the fateful moment of every national crisis.
Courtesy: The Nation

Terrorist surge and its implications

TARIQ OSMAN HYDER
October 21, 2009

There has been a surge of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The most audacious being the precision assault on the headquarters of the Pakistan Army followed by the coordinated triple attack on FIA and Police establishments in Lahore, accompanied by daily bomb blasts. The army is now a major target after its largely successful operation in Swat and because of a major offensive under way in South Waziristan, followed by the FIA and Police. The Swat operation was a milestone in the counter terrorism campaign. It was made possible only by the build-up of public, political and media support, on which the sustainability of the effort depends.
For the outside world and Pakistan this spate of attacks raises a number of questions. Is the security situation deteriorating and will the military, paramilitary and police forces be put on the defensive with heightened public insecurity eroding public morale? What response strategy can deliver? The US media has criticised the army's security for not stopping the attack at the outermost security cordon perimeter. This critique implies that the military's capacity in the counter terrorism campaign depends in significant part on the controversial Kerry-Lugar assistance legislation.
To analyse what the present situation portends one must view this struggle between the forces for a progressive Pakistan and the militants' vision of a theocratic Pakistan in the context of national dynamics, regional and international parallels and of the timescale and resources required to win this battle for the soul of Pakistan.
As far as the Pakistan Army is concerned, while lessons should be learnt, the attack on its HQ was contained and took time to end because of the hostages. America, the most advanced country in the world was unable to prevent 9/11. The Mumbai attack virtually took another metropolis hostage. Despite massive military and monetary intervention in Iraq, the security situation has forced America into an exit strategy. While even more resources and troops are being poured into Afghanistan, attacks against civilians and the military are far higher than in Pakistan with its eleven times larger population.
Pakistan, like most developing countries and Muslim countries, is a fractured society with significant gaps between haves and have-nots. Developmental efforts have not been well planned or competently administered due to the lack of political stability or good governance and deteriorating state institutions. The hegemonistic ambitions of India and its unwillingness to move on the Kashmir dispute necessitated large defence expenditures. The erosion of the government's public education system has divided the youth into three streams: those attending private schools who reap the opportunities; those going to government schools who are at a grave disadvantage; and the resourceless multitude attending the madrassahs, which had a revered place in Muslim education, but since the American sponsored Afghan Jihad have become the driving force for discontented youth.
The battle against the militants has become multi-dimensional. In border regions, military counter insurgency coupled with re-establishing administration and development will predominate. In settled areas, urban warfare with the terrorists using asymmetrical acts of explosive violence and precision attacks against the symbols of the state will have to be dealt with through different tactics including better intelligence gathering and coordination to more aggressively utilising existing military and civil resources.
The strength of the militants and their access to arms from Afghanistan is dependent on funding. Some comes from drug money and hostile intelligence agencies across the border. A small part is raised within Pakistan. However the largest amount is received by transfers using both banking and illegal channels. This is borne out by the fact that while from documented remittance flows some seven billion dollars a year comes from overseas workers, a grey area of four million dollars comes ostensibly for charitable, educational and other purposes from other parties. Pakistan must forcibly address this problem with known conduit countries and by activating its investigative and regulatory mechanisms, including the State Bank's Financial Investigation Unit and the FIA. Certainly, the United States has the muscle to do more on this vital external funding front.
It will take five to 10 years to defeat the militant threat. The East Punjab insurgency in a far smaller area took 10 years to overcome, the LTTE 30 years. It will take a generation to reverse causational social conditions. That is the scale on which to assess whether or not the security situation in Pakistan is deteriorating. The militants have been hard hit and are fighting back to break the public and governmental resolve. Continued military operations in South Waziristan and elsewhere will lead to increased terrorist attacks, but the losses they inflict should be far less than what is meted out to them.
While democracy must be strengthened, the army remains the strongest and most cohesive force in Pakistan which can tackle the terrorist threat. However, its counterinsurgency and surveillance capabilities must be improved. Equally important, socio-economic development has to be accelerated.
The now passed Kerry-Lugar Bill contains clauses detrimental to Pakistan's self-respect which should have been modified. However, the controversy missed the main point that if America and its Western allies are serious about defeating terrorism the assistance must be at least three to five times more in order to help Pakistan overcome this threat, part of a global terrorist network strengthened by their occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Pakistan must also diversify incoming assistance, lessen dependence on American military assistance, expand and add value to its exports to generate its own resources. Our window of vulnerability lies in our deficit balance of payments, between what we earn and what we spend, which necessitates external assistance from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and bilateral sources with inevitable conditionalities, which circumscribes our freedom of manoeuvre and policy choices.
Without adequate multinational economic and military equipment support and also action by the Extra Regional Forces to control the border from the Afghan side, the battle in Pakistan will take far longer. It is also in India's interest to live up to its declared objective of wanting good relations with a stable Pakistan. Certainly, if there is evidence to the contrary it must be made public by our government.
The writer is a retired Pakistani diplomat.
Courtesy: The Nation

Pakistan: trapped in the US game plan

Shireen M Mazari
October 21, 2009

There is a dangerous pattern connecting the events happening in and around Pakistan today. Unless we can see this larger picture, we will be overwhelmed by the fallout and our detractors like the US will have fulfilled their agenda for this nuclear capable country. The roots of this US agenda go back to Musharraf’s hasty embrace of the US “war on terror”. What was not realised at the time was the psychological trauma the US had undergone as a result of 9/11, which had led to the bolstering of the already suspicion-tinted view the US had of the Muslim world. Of course, some pliant Muslim leaders were reluctantly embraced as “allies”, but always on a tight leash, but by and large nationalist Muslim leaders and their nations were something the Americans never felt comfortable with. If these nations were also militarily or economically strong, the US felt even more uncomfortable. In this context, Mahathir’s Malaysia, Revolutionary Iran and nuclear Pakistan certainly stood out as irritants in one way or another. So when 9/11 happened, even though it was Saudi citizens who were responsible for the actions, Pakistan was brought centre-stage and the US saw this as the opportunity to cut the country down to size and finally gain control of its nuclear assets.
That Musharraf proved excessively compliant from the beginning came as a shock even to the Bush Administration, but they realised his limitations in terms of compromises at the tactical level because of the military - which often put a spanner in the US agenda for Pakistan. Hence the constant critique of the Pakistan military and its intelligence outfits - especially once the CIA fell out with the ISI two years ago over whom to target in FATA!
So what is this US agenda that bodes ill for Pakistan? An article published in the US Army Journal entitled “Blood Borders” captured the broad outline a few years earlier. The main components that can now be identified are: One, to restructure Pakistan and its state institutions according to US wishes; two, to take control of its nuclear assets since they cannot really be “taken out”; and, three, to move it towards accepting Indian hegemony in the region and to distance it from its strategic partnership with China.
What has been the strategy for implementing this agenda? To create enough chaos and violence in Pakistan so as to be able to justify coming in and seizing control of the nuclear assets, restructuring a new state model for the country, which would include bringing it under Indian hegemony. How would this agenda be implemented?
First, through shifting the centre of gravity of the war in Afghanistan to Pakistan. This has finally been accomplished through a number of interesting tactics. The beginning was made by allowing the Al-Qaeda and Taliban to escape from Afghanistan during the Tora Bora bombings. Then the internal destabilisation of Pakistan began through drone attacks, which caused the traditionally highly patriotic tribal population of FATA to gradually turn against the state especially when the US pressured the army into moving into this area. Also, India was given a free run in Afghanistan so money and weapons for terrorists flowed in from Afghanistan into Balochistan and FATA as well as NWFP. In addition, a new entity emerged with its own violent agenda - the TTP with a huge stock of weapons that clearly had come from across the border since some of them were of US origin. Meanwhile, the US gradually increased its covert presence in Pakistan - beginning with Tarbela and the so-called “trainers” as well as the private US security concerns that have traditionally worked as mercenaries for the US government in places like Iraq. Balochistan also saw an increase in the US presence, especially as the US also sought to operationalise its covert operations against Iran through this province and the bases Musharraf had so generously handed over to the US. There was also the Bandari air base in an area 78 kilometres south of Kharan, near a place called Shimsi - not Shamsi base which is on the border with Iran near Dalbandin - from where the drones have been flying. This is the only airport that is not listed as being under CAA control.
All along, the US at the diplomatic and political levels was continuing with its “do more” mantra and undermining the credibility of the military in terms of its intent vis-à-vis fighting extremism and terrorism. The ISI especially was singled out for attack while the nuclear assets kept coming in for periodic targeting by the US media. As the US became more bogged down in Afghanistan, it sought to shift its failures on to Pakistan so that in the end many assume that it is this reason that has forced the US to shift the war to Pakistan. However, that may only be an offshoot of the larger original game plan to destabilise Pakistan from within by taking the war to the heart of the country - which is where the situation stands poised right now. The Musharraf-US alliance would have continued, but for the people of Pakistan’s desire for justice and freedom which spurred the judicial movement when Musharraf overplayed his hand. But once again the nation was short-changed because the US cleverly managed a new partner linked through the NRO. In Zardari they found an even more cooperative leader - and with democratic credentials to boot! If Musharraf had begun the granting of unfettered access to the US, the Zardari regime has taken it beyond all limits.
The second phase of the US implementation strategy has now begun to be operat-ionalised - that is, to destabilise Pakistan from within by increasing acts of terror carried out in Pakistani cities through well-trained and well-equipped groups centring on TTP - which finds no mention in the Kerry-Lugar Act. Alongside, the military has been tied down in military operations, first in Swat and now in SWA - which has its own fallouts in terms of terrorism and displacement of the population. It has also become necessary to isolate Pakistan from its neighbours and hence the extensive terrorist attacks on Iran’s security forces in Sistan province bordering Pakistan’s Balochistan, so that Iran-Pakistan relations are destroyed - Iran being the only friendly neighbour apart from China. The US covert presence in Pakistan has also now been put in place like a web - beginning from Sindh and Balochistan in the south and southwest, to Punjab to the Capital to Peshawar. There are now US armed covert operatives along with overt marines surrounding the Pakistanis and their nuclear assets. The Kerry-Lugar Act merely gives formal recognition to what has already happened in practice - submission to US diktat.
Only one last phase of the US agenda has to be operat-ionalised, but that will be the toughest. This is to push the country into a civil war-like situation by threatening to target Quetta and southern Punjab as well as Muridke. First there was pressure on the army to move into Swat; now it is SWA and the new mantra of moving the army into southern Punjab has already begun! Overstretch the military and create civil-military fissures so as to totally destabilise the country. When there is a state of total chaos, the US can pressure the UNSC into allowing it to takeover Pakistan’s nuclear assets - what will euphemistically be termed “under international control”. But the big problem now is that too many in the corridors of power in Pakistan are beginning to see the light while the people have also woken up to the lethal American agenda for Pakistan. Unless we can see the whole US game plan, and connect all the dots we will continue to fall prey to this destructive design.
Courtesy: The News

Forgotten lessons of history

Roedad Khan
October 21, 2009

On Saturday last, the army launched an operation, code-named Rah-i-Nijat against Mehsud strongholds in South Waziristan. "Both air and ground troops are taking part", Major General Athar Abbas, Chief of the Inter-Services Public Relation told the journalists. Earlier Army Chief General Kayani briefed the political leadership on the "imperative" of the operation against the Mehsuds. The die is cast. An invisible Rubicon crossed.
With this operation Pakistan is launched on the path to a protracted, inconclusive war in the mountains of Waziristan. The decision to commit our forces to such a war is, in my view, a tragic error. Waziristan may not be Vietnam but it has its own river of history that General Kayani is now stepping into.
Once again, there is a dry wind blowing throughout Waziristan and parched grasses wait the spark. Now that the match is lit, the blaze may spread like wildfire throughout the tribal area. Talking about Waziristan, a Mehsud tribesman told a missionary doctor at Bannu: "When God created the world there were a lot of stones and rocks and other lumber left over which were all dumped down on this frontier".
In the early 1900s, a crusty British general, Andrew Skeen, wrote a guide to military operation in Waziristan. His first piece of advice: "When planning a military expedition into Pashtun tribal areas, the first thing you must plan is your retreat. All expeditions into this area sooner or later end in retreat under fire".
The British decision to send troops into the Khaisora valley in November 1936 which transformed Ipi's agitation into a full scale uprising almost over night and set Waziristan on fire which lasted until after 1947. The British failed to capture Ipi and the campaign had to be called off. The judgment displayed by the British and the poor intelligence upon which they based their decisions were chiefly to blame for the disasters that followed. This was the last major rebellion in Waziristan which stemmed from an abrupt change of policy.
The tribesmen's unrivalled fighting record, their ability to intervene in Afghan affairs and to involve Afghans in their own affairs, were factors ignored by the British that made Waziristan different from other Frontier areas. This disastrous attempt to "pacify" Waziristan was the last of several major incursions into tribal territory during the hundred years of Britain's presence in Northwest India. On each occasion the tribes and the mountains won a strategic victory, despite local tactical reverses, and the bulk of the Indian troops were forced to withdraw back into the plains of the Indus valley. The British soon learned that you can annex land but not people.
When the British left, Pakistan had reason to be glad that it had inherited a secure North West Frontier. In September 1947, Mr. Jinnah took a bold decision to reverse the "pacification" policy, withdrew regular troops from Waziristan and entered into new agreements with the tribes. Cunningham, the new governor of NWFP, appointed by Mr Jinnah was a Frontier expert. His disillusion with the "pacification" policy was complete. "I think that we must now face a complete change of policy. Razmak has been occupied by regular troops for nearly 25 years. Wana for a few years less. The occupation of Waziristan has been a failure. It has not achieved peace or any appreciable economic development. It ties up an unreasonably large number of troops, and for the last 10 years there have been frequent major and minor offenses against the troops." The change in policy produced dramatic results and paid rich dividends.
All this has now changed. Mr Jinnah's Waziristan policy which had stood the test of time has been reversed. Our troops are back in Waziristan. Some time back, the commander of the US led troops in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Borno, let the cat out of the bag when he said that US and Pakistani forces were working together like "hammer and anvil" to trap Osama and Al Qaeda forces along the border".
Those who know the Frontier are deeply concerned. The Pakistan government is playing with fire. By reversing Mr Jinnah's Waziristan policy, at the behest of Americans, it has alienated powerful tribes in Waziristan and unsettled our western border which had remained peaceful for 62 years since the birth of Pakistan.
The nation is beginning to see the rapidly unfurling consequences of General Musharraf's fateful decision to join the "coalition of the coerced". America's dreaded war on terror has indisputably arrived on Pakistan's soil. Pakistan is slipping into anarchy and stands on the brink of civil war. A perfect storm is looming on the horizon.
We have stumbled into a war that we cannot fight and win for the simple reason that we don't seem to realize what guerrilla war is like. We are sending conventional troops to do an unconventional job. I can foresee a perilous voyage. The war in Waziristan cannot be won because it is perceived as the white man's war. It could be won only if perceived by the powerful tribes as Pakistan's own war. That, unfortunately, is not how they perceive this war. The conflict will, no doubt, be long and protracted. We will suffer more because not even a great power can beat guerrillas. The enemy cannot be seen: he is indigenous to the country. My fear is that we will get bogged down.
War against our own people is too terrible a thing to resort to. Many questions spring to mind. Was the decision to go to war determined by the absence of other viable options? Why was it not debated in parliament? Why deploy military means in pursuit of an indeterminate and primarily political end? Was there a geopolitical imperative to resort to war in Waziristan? Aren't we Pakistanising the American war on our soil?
We must also recognize the limitations of modern, high technology, military equipment in confronting highly motivated guerrilla movement in a treacherous terrain. We must also recognize that the consequences of large-scale military operations – against our own people – particularly in this age of highly sophisticated and destructive weapons – are inherently difficult to predict and control. Therefore, they must be avoided, excepting only when our nation's security is clearly and directly threatened. These are the lessons of history. Pray God we learn them. But as George Bernard Shaw said: "We learn from history that we learn nothing from history."
Courtesy: The News

The way forward

Hamid Mir
October 20, 2009

Many Pakistanis still remember the prediction of a US military advisor, David Kalcullin, in March this year. He claimed that Pakistan may collapse in the next six months and Taliban will take over Islamabad. Six months passed in September 2009. Pakistan is not only intact but Pakistani security forces defeated Taliban in Swat. Now Pakistan Army has started a new operation in South Waziristan but misunderstandings about Pakistan are still visible in Washington. This time US policy makers fear a military coup against Zardari-led government in Pakistan. They think that a successful operation in South Waziristan will give more credibility and popularity to Pakistan Army, which will further undermine the authority of Zardari government in Pakistan. Very few people in Washington realise that tension between Pakistan Army and President Zardari were actually created by Kerry-Lugar Bill.
US Congressman John F Tierney is the one who led the efforts to include several controversial provisions in the Kerry-Lugar Bill. He is the chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs in the US Congress. He tried his level best to defend the Kerry-Lugar Bill in a conference on US-Pakistan relations in Harvard University the other day. Harvard Extension International Relations Club organised the Conference. The US ambassador of Pakistan, Mr Hussain Haqqani, PML-N secretary information Ahsan Iqbal, myself and some other experts were also invited to speak there. This conference provided an excellent opportunity to the students and academia of Harvard to listen the arguments from both sides but unfortunately there was no consensus that how to move forward jointly in the right direction. Ambassador Haqqani rightly said that the only way forward is democracy. US must support democracy in Pakistan. When I raised a question why the US is not listening to the voice of democracy in Pakistan coming through an elected parliament? There was no answer from US side.
No doubt that the US is the most controversial country in Pakistan and Pakistan is the most misunderstood country in the US. There is a huge mistrust on both sides but even then both countries need cooperation of each other because they are facing some common threats. Pakistan lies in one of the world's most important geopolitical regions surrounded by Afghanistan, Iran, China and India.
One must admit that many international players want to turn Afghanistan into another Vietnam for US. These international players will take advantage of the mistrust created by Kerry-Lugar Bill between Pakistani military and US. I don't doubt the intensions of Senator John Kerry because he really wanted to help Pakistan but weak public diplomacy of Obama administration became a big problem for Senator Kerry. US Congress tried to remove misunderstandings through an explanation but many questions are still there.
Many Pakistani legislatures felt that once again the US Congress ignored the concerns raised about the Kerry-Lugar Bill in their parliament. The Pakistani parliament has adopted unanimous resolution against US drone attacks in the past but US just ignored the voice of Pakistani parliament and increased the drone attacks. Increase in drone attacks has increased suicide bombings in Pakistan. Today US and Pakistan need a joint strategy to defeat terrorism. How can we form a joint strategy to defeat terrorism in the region?
First of all US must stop its drone attacks in Pakistan. US is using drone with a justification that Taliban and Al Qaeda militants are using Pakistani tribal areas as a base to attack NATO forces in Afghanistan. If this is the case then why is the US not interested in securing the 2,500-kilometres-long border between Pakistan and Afghanistan? Why is there no fencing and no proper border check posts? There are more than 350 illegal entry points on the Pak-Afghan border. Every day more than 20,000 vehicles and 45,000 people cross the border without proper documents. How can we stop the cross-border movement of militants if the border is not properly secured?
Secondly the US must give a roadmap for the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. Remember that US President Obama won his election in the name of peace. He opposed the adventurous policies of Bush administration but today he is just following the policies of Bush by sending more and more troops to Afghanistan. Does Obama have any substitute of US troops in Afghanistan? Yes, Obama can give a strong role to UN in Afghanistan. UN peacekeeping forces from countries like Turkey, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Egypt should replace US and NATO troops. People of Afghanistan and Pakistan will have more trust in the neutral peacekeeping forces of UN. Replacement of Western troops with Asian troops will weaken Taliban and Al Qaeda. They will lose justification that they are fighting against crusaders.
Thirdly, international community must start immediate efforts to turn Afghanistan into a neutral country like Switzerland. All the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan are interfering there. They are fighting their proxy wars in Afghanistan. A contact group of countries like Pakistan, Iran, Russia, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, India, US, Saudi Arabia, Germany and Japan should be created under UN umbrella. This group must chalk out a plan to stop foreign interference not only in Afghanistan but also in the whole region. US must realise that its presence in the region is the root cause of the problem. Nobody can deny the fact that Pakistan and Afghanistan have become unsafe after the arrival of US troops in the region.
Many people ask the question why there was no insurgency in FATA and Balochistan province before 2002? Many people rightly or wrongly say that the Baloch insurgents are getting training and arms from Afghanistan, which is actually controlled by the US. The US is always concerned by the alleged presence of Taliban in Quetta, but why has the US administration not expressed any concern about the terrorist activities of Baloch insurgents around Quetta? Congressman Tierney told his audience in Harvard that "I am a friend of Pakistan and I will always be honest with Pakistan. I expect the same thing from my counterpart." Honesty demands that US administration must listen to the majority of Pakistanis and answer their valid questions. Honesty demands that if the Supreme Court of Pakistan has given a verdict against a dictator on July 31, 2009, the dictator must be tried in Pakistan and if someone is claiming that Musharraf could not be tried because some "foreign powers" don't want his trail then the US must clarify that at least Washington is not trying to protect the dictator.
It is a fact that the Bush administration brokered a deal between some political players and Pervez Musharraf through infamous "National Reconciliation Ordinance" in 2007. This NRO legitimised corruption in Pakistan. Zardari government has tabled NRO in the parliament. Majority of Pakistanis want their parliament to reject NRO. Honesty demands that Obama administration should stay away from protecting NRO. Majority of Pakistanis believe in democracy but they want a neat and clean democracy. They hate corrupt democracy. They hate any Pakistani Karzai who is more powerful than the elected parliament. Only a powerful parliament, independent judiciary and free media can stop a military coup in Pakistan. No, Karzai can stop a military coup because Karzai always lacks support from his own public. People like David Kalcullin have always created misconceived panic in Washington about Pakistan. Washington needs to understand and respect the will of the common man in Pakistan. They want to become friends but not slave of US. This is the only way forward.
Courtesy: The News

Cycle of violence

Dr Muzaffar Iqbal
October 17, 2009

As the season changes and 2009 hurls to its inevitable end--with an ever-changing yet ever-present scenario of random as well as planned violence, inflicting lands stretching from Afghanistan to Iraq with Pakistan at the centre--one is inclined to look at the grand scheme of things from which this unbridled violence has emerged to claim thousands of lives. What has made these ancient lands so full of violence and death? Why is so much blood being spilled in certain countries of the world and not in others? What is behind this ever-present scene of ruthless killing of human beings in these lands which are supposed to be filled with a sense of security and peace because the majority of people who inhabit these ancient lands are Muslim--that is, those from whose hands other human beings are supposed to be safe?
The case of Iraq is rather clear: a ruthless military dictator came to power, established an unjust system of governance and ruled with an iron fist, until he became too big for his boots: his ambition invited foreign players who used him against Iran, then overthrew him and killed him once he started to misbehave. The illegal and immoral invasion of Iraq led to the destruction of whatever system there was and killing and displacement of millions of human beings. Thus violence was sowed in the land and it is being harvested.
The case of Afghanistan is likewise explicable: The Soviet invasion of 1979 brought this sleepy pre-modern land to the forefront of an international confrontation, and the American involvement in its affairs since then has been at the root of all its problems. It continues to remain under American occupation and thus, after thirty years of violence and with continuous occupation by foreign troops, it has little possibility of peace.
The case of Pakistan is rather strange: it seems that this land was hurled into the fire, rather than giving birth to a now intensifying cycle of violence and death. Despite its political instability, Pakistan was still a peaceful land until Z A Bhutto was hanged at Central jail, Rawalpindi, on 4 April, 1979. Whatever the personal shortcomings of Z A Bhutto, he was a man of a previous era--an age in which politics still followed certain rules of conduct and his famous declaration about the murder case against him still holds: My lord, he had said in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, this is not a case of murder; it is murder of a case.
Despite his political activism and grassroots appeal, it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who planted seeds of violence in Pakistan. His socialist policies, coming so late in the day when the entire world was moving in the opposite direction, his failed economic policies which slowed down Pakistan's economic progress, and, most of all, his human-rights abuses, especially those in Balochistan, certainly destabilised Pakistan and strained its already weak socio-political fabric.
As if this was not enough, the military dictator who replaced him poured oil over fire by opening Pakistan to the Afghan drug trade and American weapons: thousands of Pakistanis were recruited to fight a war in Afghanistan, which despite its glorious title of Afghan Jihad, was, in the final analysis, an American war. Thousands more came from other parts of the Muslim world through a well-advertised and well-funded campaign.
In the heydays of the Afghan Jihad, no one was concerned about the after-effects of that war; no one was concerned about the spread of weapons in Pakistan and the consequent emergence of smaller groups which would turn their weapons against the state once the Afghan Jihad was over. True, Afghanistan needed to be released from the Soviet iron fist and there as an Islamic imperative for this, but the same Islamic imperative also demands sagacity in matters that involved the living conditions which would affect future generations. No one was concerned about what would have happen once the Soviet army retreats; no one was inclined to look into the consequences of playing with the fire as if the terrible price of such a play was a joking matter.
Since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Afghanistan has remained filled with violence, and the ever-increasing circle of the violence that originated in that country is now sweeping through Pakistan. The uncontrollable smaller units of armed men can walk into any city, mosque, building, or other public space and kill at will. This is not what the 180 million people of Pakistan had hoped for; this is not the dream for which millions of people sacrificed their lives and property in 1947; this is not the consequence of anything that emerged from within Pakistan; violence is a foreign element that has intruded and penetrated every nook and corner of public life in Pakistan.
Yet, despite its ubiquitous presence, the present cycle of violence cannot be allowed to become the defining feature of Pakistani polity; it must be brought to a full stop and a new beginning needs to be made for the future of Pakistan. That new beginning requires an entirely new paradigm--an entirely new operative mechanism at the national level. This new policy directive needs to come into existence through a thorough and critical analysis of the present state of affairs, keeping in view the historical roots of violence and the multi-directionality of the very volatile situation that now exists in Pakistan. This is not a weekend project; it requires deep understanding of historical forces which have pushed Pakistan into the cycle of violence and fiercely independent and sincere minds which can come up with a blueprint for a different future for Pakistan. In the absence of such an exercise, the default would be the continuation, even escalation, of violence which now grips Pakistan.
Courtesy: The News

Taking on the real enemy

Shafqat Mahmood
October 16, 2009

Does the brazen attack on the army's General Headquarters (GHQ) show the terrorists' strength or weakness? However contradictory as it may sound, it demonstrates both. The strength is in the fact that disparate militant elements coming from different parts of the country have coalesced into a coordinated terror network. The weakness is that to make their presence felt, desperate acts with loss of precious assets, have to be undertaken.
Let us look at the strength first. Radical religious groups originating from the Punjab either had an anti-India/pro-Kashmir jihad agenda, in which they had some collaboration from the state. Or they were sectarian outfits targeting Shias, in particular, but also other Sunni groups.
Tribal area based militants were a product of the long Afghan conflict starting in the 80s. After the American invasion of Afghanistan, they became aligned with Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. To find out in detail how this happened please read Imtiaz Gul's book, The Al Qaeda Connection.
Their objective initially was to provide support and safe haven to fleeing Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban. As Gul points out, money played an important part in this. When the Pakistani state began to make life difficult for them, they took it on. Later, their objective morphed into controlling Pakistani territory and establishing a state within a state. This was visible in their Malakand outreach and deliberate infiltration into other parts of NWFP.
These dissimilar groups have now come together with the common agenda of fighting the Pakistani state and this has become the militancy's strength. This merger has been facilitated by their shared hatred of the United States and a warped perception of an ideal Islamic state. They seek to establish it in Pakistan.
The weakness of the terrorist network is reflected in the reckless nature of the GHQ attack. It was indeed audacious and achieved some early results until the Pakistan Army commandos ended it an operation. Many brave soldiers gave the ultimate sacrifice and no words can express the nation's gratitude to them.
But, from the militants' perspective, this attack cost them heavily. They sacrificed an important asset in the shape of the terrorist Aqeel, who has been captured. This raises the possibility of at least parts of their network being exposed.
They could not have been unaware of these pitfalls while planning the operation. It must have been obvious that attacking the GHQ is nothing short of a suicide mission with a low chance of success. The only explanation for this is desperation.
This stems from victory of the armed forces in Malakand that has dealt a deadly blow to the militants, both physically and to their aura of invincibility. The elimination of some top leaders like Baituallah Mehsud and other prominent Al Qaeda allies has further weakened them. The current wave of terror attacks and, particularly, the GHQ operation was a desperate attempt to project strength at a time when the noose is tightening around them.
This is where the forthcoming Waziristan operation becomes so critical. It will be tough given the terrain and the strength of the militants and, sadly, many brave soldiers will die for their country. But, it is the ultimate safe haven crammed with Al Qaeda, Afghan and local Taliban, Uzbeks and Chechens and many wanted terrorists from Punjab. This scorpions den has to be wiped clean.
It will require coordination with American/NATO forces in Afghanistan because unless these elements are interdicted from the other side, they will just vanish and regroup on Afghan territory. The Americans have been pushing for this operation and should do what it takes but will the current imbroglio over the Kerry-Lugar Bill have any effect? Unlikely, because the military to military cooperation is apparently good. While there has been a political reaction to the Pakistan Army's public stance against clauses of the Kerry-Lugar Bill, there has not been a word from the US military. Representative Berman who has taken a lead in this was clearly defending his own position because he is responsible for the folly of putting intemperate language in the bill.
This is also now being widely recognised in the United States. An important commentator in The Washington Post, David Ignatius, said that "the finger-wagging conditions in the bill illustrate a special form of American hubris. US politicians become so accustomed to lecturing others that they lose sight of how their words will be read in foreign capitals and how legislative boilerplate will play on foreign insecurities and anxieties."
Ignatius has aptly identified the kind of mindset that prevails in the American legislative branch. It would also be useful to understand that the parliament, known as Congress in the US, can often act like loose cannon. Its pronouncements, particularly of the lower house, can totally be at variance with the policy of the executive branch.
The various lobbyists that surround it have influence, particularly the Israeli lobby on Mideast issues. But to imagine that on every matter interest groups and particularly foreign representatives will be able to insert language of their choice in legislative acts displays total ignorance of the American system.
It is in this context that I find dark conspiracies attributed to Pakistan's Ambassador Hussain Haqqani so overblown. Haqqani has been a public figure for a long time and many people, including me, can have issues with his political choices and policy postures. But to attribute downright treachery indeed treason to him is uncalled for and entirely without substance.
This may not relate to the topic at hand but if one has to go looking for people who have harmed the country, there is no need to go further than Jamshed Dasti, MNA. This man, who is the chairman of the National Assembly committee on sports, severely damaged our cricket team's already controversial image by alleging match fixing.
Such people have no right to operate at the national level. He showed his true colours by hurling filthy abuses during a session of the national assembly. While I am no fan of Faisal Saleh Hayat, people like Dasti should be told to go back to the hole they have come out of.
What of the Kerry-Lugar Bill and how are we going to move forward? As I said last week, there is little chance of the bill's language being changed. A sop to the Pakistani sensibilities is coming in the shape of a statement that will swear everlasting commitment to Pakistan. This fig leaf will be gratefully accepted by the government. The language of the bill will not change.
The reality is that Pakistan and the United States both need each other. Some would argue that the US needs Pakistan more than we need it but this is nothing more than bravado. Pakistan has severe economic and security problems and US help is important.
This can change if the society transforms itself and particularly the well off are willing to reduce their lifestyle. But, that is unlikely to happen. In the meantime, the equation is simple. We need the money.
Courtesy: The News

Pakistan: countering insurgency?

Mushfiq Murshed
The suicide attack on October 04 in the World Food Programme Office in Islamabad took five lives. The subsequent warning by the Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, that similar attacks should be expected in the near future is contrary to his earlier statement that the military operation in FATA has broken the backbone of the Taliban insurgency.
The aftermath of this particular suicide attack shows the effectiveness of the Taliban strategy. Fear has gripped the country, once again, and the United Nations has closed its offices nationwide for an indefinite duration.
Conversely, the success of the military operations in FATA and the Malakand Division cannot be denied. However, this one-dimensional reactive strategy, although necessary, will not be sufficient. The Pakistani government and the armed forces have concentrated their efforts on the factions that have posed a direct and immediate threat to the sovereignty and security of the country. The remaining militants continue business-as-usual.
As the insurgency in Afghanistan spreads to the North of the Hindu Kush and Taliban activity intensifies, the US and ISAF, in turn, have also intensified pressure on Pakistan by blaming the latter for their somewhat failing Afghan strategy. These allegations, unfortunately, are not mere speculations.
Their latest accusation has been that the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), which is considered as the biggest threat to counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan is being led by Mullah Omar who is also said to be residing in the city along with other influential leaders of his faction.
A case could be put forward that the Pakistan Army does not have the necessary resources and capability to tackle militants in multiple fronts, as the country requires an effective military presence on its eastern borders as well. However, the Indian threat is no longer restricted to the eastern border. Some feel that it is India’s heightened presence in Afghanistan and perceived intervention in the Balochistan insurgency that has prompted Pakistan to revive its strategic depth strategy through surreptitious assistance to the Afghan Taliban.
The US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, addressed this issue in an assessment that was sent to US Defense Secretary Gates. He observed: “Increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan and India.” The establishment of India’s first foreign military base in Farkhor, Tajikistan, has further intensified the mistrust.
Islamabad, however, cannot afford to revert to its previously failed strategy of strategic depth for which it will, once again, require the cooperation of non-state actors. These issues need to be addressed diplomatically and international pressure, primarily from the US, needs to be asserted for India to rollback its presence from the area, re-engage Pakistan through composite dialogue and de-escalate tensions so that Pakistan may concentrate more of its resources and energy in the war against militancy.
Meanwhile, a more comprehensive strategy has to be developed in Pakistan to target the multiple factions of militants operating in the country, irrespective of whether the latter’s perceived agenda is a direct threat or not to the former. They are all intertwined through an intricate network where funds, ammunition and soldiers flow freely from one faction to another.
Various militant offshoots are scattered throughout the country. No province or city is immune from their influence, however, Punjab is faced with the most immediate and ominous threat. It is predicted that the next big insurgency emanating from the south of Punjab, where according to some estimates, their numbers have risen to approximately 100,000, will be far more devastating than the present scenario due to their proximity to urban cities. At the moment, security forces at the disposal of any provincial administration are incapable of tackling such a formidable opponent.
Intelligence and pre-emptive strikes are the appropriate counterinsurgency strategies to apply before these movements gather a momentum that can only be stopped through military intervention and possible urban warfare. For this the security forces within the provinces need to be enhanced through training, recruitment and provision of resources.
Furthermore, a workable inter-provincial and centre partnership strategy to counter insurgencies and terrorism needs to be devised and implemented. A unanimous nationwide consensus against militancy in Pakistan was reached after the capitulation of Swat and the misery that millions of IDPs faced in mismanaged camps. Unfortunately, despite this consensus, petty politicking, personal agendas and inter-provincial mistrust have presented roadblocks in establishing a coordinated and unified strategy. The subsequent vacuum has provided the militants space and time to plan and orchestrate their terrorist attacks of which, the WFP office is just a prelude.
The writer is the editor-in-chief of Criterion Quarterly.
Courtesy: The Nation

US Afghan strategy

By I. M. Mohsin

While the new strategy submitted by General McChrystal is being considered by the White House, things appear to be going awfully awry on the battleground. A recent AP report stressed that last year was the worst in terms of insurgency-related deaths, which soared to more than five thousand. Likewise, since the recent surge of troops, the Taliban threatened upping the ante. True to their warning, July/August saw a hundred US troops killed besides many times more sent out on DI-list. September too has seen a lot of the same trend while October’s opening attacks denote dreary dimensions of the on-going war.
The latest such attack on US forces launched on October 03 in Nuristan Province has, so far, killed eight US soldiers besides seven Afghan troopers. In addition, the Taliban took 15 Afghan troops into custody. Zabiullah Mujahid, the Taliban spokesman took credit for losses suffered by the US in Hamdesh District of Nuristan. He further said that the fate of the 15 hostages would be decided by their Shura. Badar, the governor of the province, claimed that the government forces were badly out-numbered. He emphasised that he had been requesting for reinforcements. The AP report further linked the Nuristan onslaught to the successful operation by the Pakistan Army in Swat which drove many militants into the contiguous Afghan area. It is said to have been a revenge attack on the US forces. The next day, an Afghan trooper killed two and injured two American colleagues after returning from a mission in Wardak.
Nuristan, like Kunar province, lies in the East which has remained the Pashtun-citadel for centuries. Across are, generally, the FATA entities of Pakistan sharing borders with NWFP and Balochistan. No wonder when disaster strikes the Pashtuns living in the East and South of Afghanistan, their only way out is to seek refuge in Pakistan. When the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, Pakistan, despite its own financial problems and without US bidding, provided all those who came to bearable survival facilities. No wonder, at the peak of war, Pakistan had over three million Afghans living on its soil. The primary motive was not politics but, generally, the Islamic concept that people in distress deserve deliverance.
Pakistan’s western border is open like its US-Mexico analogue. The British drew the Durand Line to avoid facing dangers posed by the tribes on both sides of the border. A cost-effective system was devised and run efficiently for ensuring the security of the Indian colony. It also helped them in the ‘Great Game’ of the 19th century between the British and the Russian Empires. As tradition dies hard, particularly in these areas, people’s access to either side of the border has remained fluid despite Pakistani troop-deployment. However, it is a 1700-mile long-border winding border which no state can easily shut off.
General McChrystal’s new strategy, supported by the general staff, is based on further raising the number of US and Afghan troops so that the current priority signified by the “force protection” is replaced by providing security to the local people which forms the basis of their deployment. He thinks that this move will ensure greater interaction between the forces and the people. Emphasising that “a foreign army alone cannot beat an insurgency,” he advocates that his troops should learn Pashto to win people’s “hearts and minds.” Thereby he thinks that the current COIN can be defeated. General Petraeus has highlighted that goals be pinpointed to finalise the strategy.
Afghanistan has become a thorny issue in the US. The conservatives, a la George Kennan, whose rep is George Will, in a recent column quoted the advice given by his mentor in 1966 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam: “Our country should not be asked, and should not ask of itself, to shoulder the main burden of determining the political realities in any other country. This is not only not our business, but I don’t think we can do it successfully.” It accents the dictum “what we can do” to define the limits of US power. For this credo, George Bush’s inactivity’s in Arab-Israeli dispute was the best policy though it is widely believed that he was obliged to support the Jewish state to ingratiate vested interests.
The other side appears to be guided, generally, by the idealism of President Wilson which translates in to “what we must do” foreign policy. However, the Afghan situation is so complicated that it appears to even cut across the party lines in the US. For example, Joe Biden, the Vice President, advocates a nominal role for US presence. His focus is on increasing the drone attacks against the leaders of Al-Qaeda. Joe demands all-out support for Pakistan as its security is crucial for the US. Stephen Holmes, a liberal Prof of NYU, underlines: “Turning an illegitimate government into a legitimate one is simply beyond the capacities of foreigners, however, wealthy or militarily unmatched.”
General McChrystal denounced Biden’s tactics in ISS London saying it would produce “Chaos-istan.” US Secretary Gates worries about increasing US ‘footprints’ on the Afghan soil. Keeping his reserve, he admonished: “And speaking for the Department of Defence, once the commander-in-chief makes his decisions, we will salute and execute those decisions faithfully and to the best of our ability.” Likewise, most security experts see disaster for US if Taliban seize Afghanistan. Milt Beardon, a former CIA chief in Islamabad thinks: “There is no possibility for the US to provide enough troops in Afghanistan to pacify the situation.” He insists: “Whatever we do, whatever measures we take, will affect Pakistan as the central element in this drama.” Steve Coll views India’s role as polemic. He hints that as the US past involvement has been unreliable so the Pakistani institutions, “…we’ve tended to believe that the US is today latching itself to an Indian-based strategy in South Asia.”
President Obama is listening even on Air Force One whereby he met McChrystal. The new situation makes it Churchill’s “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” NSC Advisor General Jones’ comment to CNN that “ideally it’s better for military advice to come through the chain of command,” reflects the furore at home. Pakistan can help at a terrible cost, which is going up by the day. Can the US share the suffering on a long-term basis despite its politics?
The writer is a former secretary interior.
Courtesy: The Nation

Unstable Afghanistan- The Indian factor

Mashaal Javed
15 Oct, 2009
It was the fall of Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001 that paved the way for foreign powers to intervene in Afghanistan to secure their strategic interests. The strategic location of Afghanistan provides a perfect conduit for extracting and channelling vast energy resources of Central Asia to their respective countries. However, the ingress made by these countries failed to comprehend the ground realities of Afghan polity that revolves around tribal customs and traditions. The Bonn Conference that was subsequently held after the fall of the Taliban government included major drug and warlords, sans the Pashtun representation. By castigating the major Pashtun community that had ruled Afghanistan for over 200 years from the Conference and devoiding it from any political role in the affairs of Afghanistan, the US and the West committed first strategic mistake that helped blossom the Afghan insurgency. The second was eliminating Pakistan, a country that shares common borders with Afghanistan, from under taking any kind of reconstruction work there whereas other countries including Afghanistan’s distant neighbours were provided huge funds to undertake the development work in Afghanistan. Some countries utilized the opportunity to further their own regional and strategic interests, side by side. India being one, found the playing field too vast in Afghanistan to conduct its covert activities in Baluchistan and FATA through TTP and Baluchi dissidents to destabilize Pakistan.

India established its consulates along Pakistan-Afghanistan borders and effectively used some of them to channel arms and money into Baluchistan and FATA. The proofs of Indian involvement in Baluchistan affairs has already been provided to the Indian side at the summit level at Egyptian resort of Sharmel Sheikh when the two respective leaders met there on July 16. The Indian Premier was stunned when Pakistani Prime Minister handed him over a dossier that carried photographs of Brahamdagh Bugti and other terrorists meeting Indian agents not only in Afghanistan but also during their visits to India. The dossier also included the names of Indian officials who used to meet them. The Afghanistan and the US government have been repeatedly protested with for turning a blind eye towards Indian phenomena of destabilizing Pakistan by allowing it to conduct its covert operations from across the border in Afghanistan. Christine Fair of Rand Corporation who visited one of Indian Consulates established near the borders of Pakistan, highlighted role of Indian Consulates in fomenting trouble in Pakistan during one of her television interviews. Similarly, India’s involvement has also been highlighted by another Western journalist Laura Rozen in one of her articles published in one of the Foreign Policy magazines. She quotes one of the former US official as saying that “The Indians are up to their neck in supporting the Taliban against the Pakistani government in Afghanistan and Pakistan…..the same anti Pakistani forces in Afghanistan shooting at the American soldiers are getting support from India. India should close its diplomatic establishments in Afghanistan and get the Christ out of there.”

General Stanley McChrystal, the present commander of the US and coalition forces in Afghanistan was tasked to prepare a report to analyse and recommend measures to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. The same was submitted this month to the State Department. The report glaringly points out, though diplomatically, the growing influence of India in the affairs of Afghanistan and the potential that it bears to exacerbate regional tensions. He also said that Taliban fighters in Afghanistan are being aided by ‘elements of some intelligence agencies’. Interestingly he only pointed out the ISI of Pakistan and Quds Force of Iran that are working against the US interests and the Afghan government. Strange as it may sound is the obliviousness of the General’s assumption that only two intelligence agencies are at work in the present day Afghanistan. He did not mention what role other countries’ intelligence agencies are playing in bringing stability in Afghanistan. There has been no mention of the American dreaded CIA, Israel’s Mossad, Indian RAW, German BND and British MI-16. Every intelligence agency working on ground in Afghanistan is working for the interest of its respective country. Being the immediate neighbour and threatened with growing Indian threat from the East and from across the borders in Afghanistan besides the Taliban one, it is natural for Pakistani agencies to keep watch on the developments next door that affect the integrity and security of Pakistan.

In fact it is the independent role the other intelligence agencies are playing in Afghanistan that affects the security of Pakistan. There is a conspicuous absence of trust amongst them when they work together and as such they also operate clandestinely to safeguard their respective country’s interests. The Indian intelligence agency ‘RAW’ is also at it. Despite right under the nose of American and the Afghan governments, it continues to foment trouble in Baluchistan and FATA from across the border in Afghanistan. There are reports also that massive chunks of money are being paid by the ‘RAW’ to the Taliban for attacking US interests in Afghanistan in a bid to create wedge in the mutual trust and cooperation between Pakistani and US agencies. The fact of Indian involvement in destabilizing Pakistan has been acknowledged by the American think tanks also. In one of the 2006 Council on Foreign Relations special report on Afghanistan, the author Mr. Barnett Rubin with respect to Pakistan recommended that: “The United States should strengthen its position on the Afghan side of the border and encourage India and Afghanistan not to engage in any proactive activity there”. Thus by allowing India to increase its involvement in Afghanistan, the US and the West are only helping perpetuate regional tensions that may ultimately jeopardize whatever gains US may accrue from its war in Afghanistan.

General McChrystal, in the same report has asked the American Administration for an additional placement of 43000 troops in Afghanistan if a victory is to be achieved there at all. In the wake of fresh analyses of the US war in Afghanistan, there is a growing realisation that long term stability in Afghanistan lies only in a negotiated settlement with the Taliban and not by a surge in the military. Also, The NATO and ISAF , the constituents of their armed forces in these two organizations do not seem to have a will anymore to commit additional troops for Afghanistan due to increased resentment back in their homelands, loss of lives and a persistent recession. The additional troops might be helpful to General McChrystal to cater for more security arrangements but the surge cannot solve the inherent problems of Afghanistan like the prevalent massive corruption in the government, bribery and lawlessness. The Report does not however address any political strategy to tackle the problems that ail the very fabric of Afghan polity and turned themselves as basis of the prevalent insurgency. As such, General McChrystal’s report for the moment asking for more troops is being lightly handled in the State Department. Meanwhile, the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton when queered on sending more troops to Afghanistan also shot down the request by saying, “I can tell you there are other assessments from very expert military analysts who have worked in counter insurgencies that are the exact opposite”.

Whatever actions are taken on the General’s report, it is a fact that Pakistan genuinely feels threatened with the India’s growing influence in Afghanistan. With the opening of Indian consulates near Pakistani borders and an Indian Air Base in Farkhor in Tajikistan which is used for channelling large sacks of money and intelligence officials to foment trouble in Baluchistan and FATA, Pakistan finds itself completely encircled by India. Remaining cognizant of the fact, Pakistan’s Afghan policy would naturally comprise remedies that thwart all threats emanating from the growing Indian influence in Afghanistan. General McChrystal, as such, is crystal clear in his report when he says that if Pakistan’s cooperation is to be seized with over a long term then India has to downsize its presence in all fields in Afghanistan. Meanwhile there is a school of thought amongst many regional strategists who foresee the likely permanent placement of Indian troops in Afghanistan, courtesy the US and the West once they exit Afghanistan. They also term it as the would be recipe for a regional disaster as it would end up in escalation of mutual conflict between India and Pakistan concurrently keeping Afghanistan destabilized for decades, a fact that US and the West would never like to embrace.
Courtesy: Opinion-Maker

Attack in Rawalpindi

Thursday, October 15, 2009
Salman Masood

The attack on the General Headquarters (GHQ), the nerve centre of the Pakistan Army, should not have come as a surprise to the country's 'powerful' security establishment given that the Punjab police had already sounded prior warnings of such an eventuality earlier this year. What is surprising albeit disturbing is how the response to this piece of intelligence -- so as to thwart the attack -- proved to be so lacking and inadequate.
The attackers used almost the same modus operandi – masquerading as soldiers -- as the intelligence communiqué had mentioned while adding another innovation of using a vehicle that bore an army number plate and insignia of GHQ on the windscreen. This helped them drive up to the guard post unnoticed. The guards manning the post were always vulnerable and caught by surprise, unable to respond effectively in the face of a sudden spray of bullets. The second guard post should have been better equipped and trained to respond to such an attack. It failed.
The heavily armed men, under the leadership of Aqeel, who also goes by the nom de guerre Dr Usman, afterwards not only managed to get inside one of the security buildings but also took more than three dozen hostages that included several officers.
Aqeel, an army defector, had earlier led an equally daring and galling attack on the Sri Lankan Cricket team but managed to escape the scene. Investigations by the Lahore police revealed that the attackers wanted to take hostages in that assault as well. So a hostage situation at the GHQ fits the profile of attacks led by Aqeel.
Major General Athar Abbas testified to this at a news briefing to journalists at his office located close to the building that was the scene of the bloody siege. Abbas said the terrorists wanted more than a hundred of their jailed 'brothers-in-arms' to be released. Other demands were dismissed as inconsequential by the general and were not disclosed. Media reports suggest that one of the demands included a trial of former President Pervez Musharraf. Since when have these militants started caring about the rule of law that the former general is accused of flouting?
What really happened in the 24-hour hostage situation is unclear. The media was inevitably blocked from having access and most of the information filtering out has been carefully structured and leaked. A predawn commando operation secured the release of 39 hostages. Nine attackers, including the suicide bomber who kept an eye on the 22 hostages bundled in a small room for most of the night, were killed. And the biggest reprieve was that their ringleader was caught alive – though in a severely injured condition.
The commando operation was portrayed, understandably, as an exemplary show of the valour and bravery by the soldiers who took part in the rescue effort. Congratulatory messages by the civilian leadership, which has always seen the GHQ with awe and fear, were sent, eulogising the dead soldiers and condemning those who had attacked. Patriotic songs were aired repeatedly on television news networks. A major terrorist attack had been foiled with traces linked – as usual -- to South Waziristan, the militant safe haven from where almost all of the major terrorist attacks have been planned. Thus, vows to launch an operation in South Waziristan were made yet again.
All of this aside, the fact of the matter is that the terrorist attack was neither random nor did it totally fail. The attackers did manage to get inside the premises of the army headquarters. The sense of impregnability surrounding the headquarters has been dented.
Questions about the security and safety of the nuclear facilities have surfaced yet again and should haunt those at the helm of guarding the nuclear installations. An attack on a nuclear facility is perhaps only a natural and logical progression of the way the terrorist masterminds would want this asymmetrical war to move towards.
Pakistan Army can salvage its pride and prestige only by launching a frontal assault on the terrorists who are wreaking havoc in the country. The safe havens in South Waziristan need to be eliminated. The nexus between extremists groups operating in Punjab and the militants operating in the tribal areas is widely known and needs to be broken. Army defectors and lower ranked officials have consistently been found of involvement in high profile attacks on military targets. Safety valves against such scenarios need to be worked out.
The civilian government is apparently apprehensive of ordering an inquiry into the attack, as suggested by a news report carried by The News on Wednesday. General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani should make a few heads roll. Someone should be held accountable for not following through on the intelligence reports, which were not vague or cryptic but accurate in their predictions. It would be less embarrassing than the secret, nocturnal meetings with opposition politicians.
The writer is an Islamabad-based journalist/political analyst whose writings have appeared in several international newspapers. Email: alittleblackbook@hotmail.com
Courtesy: The News