New face of Talibanisation

By Faizullah Jan
24 Oct, 2009

AS the state machinery took its time before launching the operation in Waziristan, the Taliban outflanked it by launching an offensive of their own, bringing the war to the heartland of the country.
After taking on GHQ, the proverbial nerve centre, they have shown a change in the tactics of terror: the militants’ attacks have now metamorphosed into a full-blown urban war.
The brazen attack on GHQ, which was quickly followed by three synchronised raids on security establishments in Lahore, is a change in the tactics of the Taliban. Until recently they would attack military convoys with improvised devices or their frenzied cadres would blow themselves up near a target or in a crowd. Now they have descended from the hills of Waziristan (as the common understanding goes) to extend the theatre of war. It will divide the focus of the armed forces and put many people’s lives at risk.
The day GHQ was attacked two words seemed to stick out in the local and international media: brazen and audacious. But there is more to it than merely an attack by the Taliban who have challenged the writ of the state everywhere and at will. No less than six terrorist attacks in Punjab — one targeting the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, another the Manawan police academy, the GHQ assault in Rawalpindi and three synchronised attacks against security establishments, including Manawan once more, in Lahore — bear the hallmark of militants other than the Taliban of Waziristan.
According to the New York Times, these attacks showed the deepening reach of the militant network, as well as its rising sophistication and inside knowledge of the security forces. These attacks are enough to jolt the country’s establishment out of its belief that nothing is brewing in the backyard of Punjab. The sophisticated attacks across the Indus highlight a stark reality: the phenomenon of the Taliban is not ethnic, but a national one. The most alarming aspect of this saga is that militants belonging to sectarian terror outfits have been in the forefront of these attacks.
The mastermind of the GHQ attack, Aqeel, has been associated with Lashkar-i-Jhangvi — a sectarian terror group active in Punjab since long. He was also allegedly involved in the terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team. It shows how dangerously these sectarian groups have, over the years, transformed into a force capable of taking on the state.
The southern part of Punjab shares many things with the tribal areas of the NWFP. If the century-old Frontier Crimes Regulation had imposed maliks on the common tribesmen for their control and exploitation, feudalism has sucked the life out of the common Punjabi. Exploitation and alienation is on the same level in Fata and southern Punjab, which gives common cause to the Taliban and the sectarian groups to team up against an identical enemy — the FCR in the tribal areas and feudalism in Punjab.
Things went awry when the state started patronising such organisations, which played on the inherent contradictions in society. The state wanted to privatise Kashmir and the Afghan war, but little did it know that one day the militants could turn their guns on it. The whole of the NWFP in general and Peshawar in particular had been the staging post for the so-called Afghan jihad for no less than 10 years, which is enough time to contaminate the local cultural and religious ethos. Besides, given poor economic indicators, state patronage of militancy and its long porous border with Afghanistan, the NWFP was bound to be the breeding ground for obscurantist forces like the Taliban.
When inculcating ‘jihad’ became the state policy during Gen Ziaul Haq’s dark rule and ‘jihad fi sabeelillah’ became the motto of the armed forces, the first seed of Talibanisation was sown. Genuine political leadership was banished from the country while political activity was stifled. The vacuum was then filled by sectarian and linguistic groups which left the social fabric in tatters. People started seeking identity in narrow ‘ideologies’ in the absence of national parties that could give representation to everyone.
Public display of ostentatious religiosity became the norm with small militant outfits becoming an extension of the state’s foreign policy, while mainstream leaders — including nationalists — were branded as traitors, corrupt and inept. Religious vigilantes started stalking every segment of society, especially campuses. Conformity replaced diversity of opinion; anyone falling on the wrong side of the establishment was either chased out or condemned to silence.
After years of mayhem in Afghanistan the Taliban emerged victorious, in the process attracting jihadis of every hue to the country. For the first time sectarian militants found a safe haven in Afghanistan after spilling a lot of blood in Pakistan. When the Taliban took over Kabul, it bolstered the many obscurantist factions in Pakistan. However, when the Taliban were toppled by the US after 9/11 and found sanctuary in the tribal badlands of Pakistan, a local version of the extremist militia emerged to challenge the writ of the government in the name of the Sharia.
The sectarian groups of Punjab found an ally in Fata.
The rot does not lie only in the tribal areas. While they provide sanctuary to every group that challenges the writ of the state, they have their own grievances. They may fly in the same flock but they are not birds of a feather. Once done with Waziristan the state’s focus should turn to Punjab, where sleeper cells are not sleeping anymore. This should be done before southern Punjab becomes another Swat.
Sectarian crimes accentuated by economic deprivation and socio-cultural contradictions have clothed themselves in petty identities. In the short term they need to be removed physically; in the long term the inherent contradictions have to be addressed, for which drastic steps have to be taken.
Courtesy: Dawn

Implications of the Waziristan operation

Shafqat Mahmood
October 23, 2009

The mother of all battles it may not be, but success of the Waziristan operation is critical to the fight against militancy in Pakistan. It is the last frontier, an un-policed border land, a black hole in sovereign territory that has become a centre of terror. Without taking control of it, victory in Pakistan's terror war is impossible.
The fighting is tough as was to be expected but in the end, superior force will prevail. Pakistani armed forces will eventually control South Waziristan physically.
This will not be a small achievement because it is the hardest place to fight. Through the ages, every invader of the subcontinent from the north felt its heat and the super power of the 19th century, the British, also were terribly bogged down. If successful, the Pakistan Army will achieve what others were unable too.
While it is true that in this kind of war, occupation of physical space is only a small part of the equation. It is also possible that most of the militants may filter out to Afghanistan or other parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Yet, South Waziristan is one place where taking control of territory is important.
Its space is being used as a sanctuary by Al Qaeda and other foreign militants, particularly Uzbeks. It has training schools for planning and execution of terror attacks. It is used for fabrication of terror material and for the production of suicide bombers. It is also a refuge for radical groups from Punjab and criminals of all kinds. Losing this area will be a setback to militancy.
Militants will regroup and strike in other places. No one has any illusions that this is a short war. But, bit by bit, the freedom for terrorists to operate has to be reduced. It was done in Swat and other parts of Malakand and though incidents continue to happen, the terrorists are on the run there and their ability to strike is reduced.
Hopefully, this will be the result too after the success of the Waziristan operation. The terrorist will have to find new places to regroup and it will not be easy. The only problem is that the American angle has become murky at least in the media.
On the day that American generals, Patreaus and McChrystal arrived in Islamabad, there were stories in all the papers that American forces have removed their check posts on Afghan side of the border. The implications of this are quite alarming. If true, not only would this allow the South Waziristan militants to flee to Afghanistan, it would also potentially make it easier for the Afghan Taliban to join the fight against Pakistan Army.
This story died as quickly as it surfaced but it raised intriguing possibilities. What were the Americans up to? The general assumption is that the South Waziristan operation has been coordinated with NATO/American forces in Afghanistan to the extent that they would play their role on the Afghan side to interdict any cross-border movement of militants from this side. Is this not the case?
These two are closely aligned to the Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban; who are a dominant force in the adjoining Afghan province.
This would suggest that at least this faction of the Afghan Taliban has no interest in fighting the Pakistan Army and it may have advised its local acolytes not to do so. If this is indeed the case, it is unlikely that Afghan Taliban in the region, which is the Haqqani group, would join the South Waziristan militants in the fight.
If it does pan out in this way, a wedge that is already visible between the Mehsud/South Waziristan militants and at least a faction of the Afghan Taliban will be further widened. It also means that their partners including Al Qaeda elements, fighters from foreign countries, Punjab-based militants, insurgents in Swat and other parts of the NWFP, will all have a reason to be alienated from at least the Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban.
The Haqqani group is a significant presence among the Afghan Taliban. Does this mean that stories implying Mullah Omar and the Afghan Taliban are not opposed to Pakistan and have no interest in supporting the Pakistani militancy, are true? And if so, is this the reason that the Americans are cheesed off?
Alternately, if at some stage Gul Bahadur and Nazir do change their stance or, the Afghan Taliban join the fight against the Pakistan Army, will this create an unbridgeable gulf between the two and lead to a greater impetus in hunting down Taliban leadership in Pakistan?
The Americans seem to be willing this to happen. The repeated drone attacks in North Waziristan in the past greatly angered the Gul Bahadur/Nazir faction. This did create a wedge between them and the Pakistani Army and led to an unexpected attack in the North some weeks ago that inflicted heavy casualties. Pakistan army leadership displayed a great deal of patience and no retaliatory attacks were launched. This has paid off in the truce that is visible now.
The future of Pak American cooperation on the military side depends on the decision made by President Obama regarding Afghanistan. If there is a huge surge and an all-out assault is launched on the Afghan Taliban, there is bound to be tension between the Pakistani military and American/NATO forces in Afghanistan.
This will be for two reasons. One, the Americans will continue to accuse Pakistani military of providing sanctuary to Afghan Taliban leadership in Quetta. Since the war in Afghanistan is not easy and a surge will not bring victory, the scapegoat will be Pakistan providing sanctuary to the Taliban.
Secondly, and hopefully it would not come to that, there would be pressure in the US to attack so called Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, from the air and even on ground. This will have truly horrendous consequences and lead to so much anger in Pakistan, that it will make any Pak-American cooperation in the war on terror very difficult, if not impossible.
If on the other hand, Obama decides to indentify Al Qaeda as the real enemy and open negotiations with the Afghan Taliban, it will change the scenario completely. It is an outcome that Pakistani strategist have been advocating and will allow both countries to focus their effort in removing Al Qaeda and its partners from this region.
It will also allow for a more focused broad based fight against militancy in Pakistan, where American assistance both military and non-military would be very effective. The Pakistani federal cabinet has, as predicted, accepted the fig leaf offered by the explanatory statement to the Kerry-Lugar Bill. The aid can start flowing. But, its future depends on how the situation unfolds on the military front both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Courtesy: The News

Our Af-Pak Strategy for Peace

by General Mirza Aslam Beg

The Afpak region is in a state of flux, yet it presents tremendous opportunities for diplomacy to operate and establish peace in the region. The real change has occurred in Afghanistan, after the invasion by the Soviets, and the follow up events which disturbed the peace of the world and now has reached a boiling point, where the “bubble must burst,” giving way to new realities and a new paradigm of peace in the region, and beyond. President Obama’s Afpak strategy has failed and therefore “there ought to be an exit strategy for Afghanistan.” How? That is the dilemma!!

The American and the NATO allies have lost their nerves and want to exit from Afghanistan, at the earliest. The only country, which can provide a safe exit, it is Pakistan and the only people, who can guarantee such exit, are the Taliban – the winners. The Indians who were brought into the foray, as part of the strategic alliance – “to contain and curb the rising power of China and Islamic Extremism” have proved a disappointment for the Americans. The Indians, therefore have been warned to restrain themselves, yet they may try their best to retain their influence in Afghanistan, once the exit begins.

The Taliban of today, were the Mujahideen of the 80’s, fighting against the Soviets, who were defeated and forced to withdraw. Thus the American objectives having been served, the Mujahideen became irrelevant and were denied their share in power, they had won. They were degraded by calling them ‘extremists and fundamentalists’ and were made to fight amongst themselves. After 9/11, Afghanistan was occupied and the ‘war on terror’ was launched against the Afghans, fighting for their freedom, called Taliban. The hardcore of Taliban is the young generation which was born thirty/twenty five years back and has grown under the shadows of war. Their only objective in life is to win their freedom. They have never involved themselves, outside Afghanistan. They have no truck with Al-Qaeda except the 005 Al-Qaeda Brigade, numbering about 3000, which has recently joined the Shadow Army under Mulla Umar. The Taliban, have never fired a bullet against the Pakistani security forces. In fact when tension mounted between Pakistani security forces and Baitullah Masud, Taliban sent a powerful, nine member delegation, advising Baitullah Masud, to talk and negotiate peace, but he did not listen. It is therefore evident, that the so called Pakistani Taliban are a different entity altogether, whereas the Afghan Taliban are the arbiters of the destiny of the people of Afghanistan. And rightly the Americans have already developed contact with them, who are demanding a “time-frame for withdrawal” as the pre-condition. Both, the USA and Pakistan, therefore need to support the Taliban, and not to let them be cheated of their right to form the government, as it happened in 1990. They are the winners and deserve their due place in power sharing. Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, therefore, is important - the diplomatic, political and military support - as much as for the Americans, for their safe exit.

The Europeans and the Americans have burdened Obama, with the Nobel Peace Prize, which he didn’t deserve, but the award puts moral and psychological pressure on him to perform and find peace in Afghanistan – some thing Pakistan should whole heartedly welcome. One of the declared objective of Obama therefore, is to bolster Pakistan, militarily and economically, so that Pakistan could play the desired role, to provide the safe exit as well as protect their interests in the region. In protecting American interests we have to be very discreet and mindful as not to provide the Safe Haven to them in Pakistan. The increasing number of secret agencies such as Black water, DynCorp and others, which have found space in Pakistan, are dangerous indications. Kerry Lugar bill, and the explanatory notes of individuals, like Kerry and Berman, that “there is no intention to micro-manage internal Pakistani affairs,” holds no bar on the bill, which has become law under Obama’s signature. American law cannot be over-ruled by individual undertakings, except by another law.

Pakistan has a pivotal role to play in exercise of this option. Any other option would mess-up the whole situation. Therefore, looking dispassionately at the responsibility placed on Pakistan, the following could be the steps to play its role: Improve relations with the Taliban and reestablish the past goodwill. Mainly diplomatic and political initiatives are to be undertaken and ‘no cloak and dagger activities of the intelligence agencies.’ The Indian negative influences in Afghanistan must be challenged to avoid the two-front war situation, we are facing now.The Taliban will not allow to be cheated this time of their right to form the government, being in the majority. Some neighbours of Afghanistan in particular must be kept at a distance, because, in the past, they played very negative role in the establishment of a broad-based government in Afghanistan.Pakhtunistan has emerged as a reality. There are over three million of them in Karachi – the economic support base – and their power extends to Balochistan, NWFP and to the Hindukush Mountains. Their fight for freedom, since 1980, has galvanized them into a formidable force, combining the forces of Pakhtun Nationalism, Islamic Idealism (Jehad) and Universalism of the Islamic Resistance against oppression, with its hard core, resting along the Durand Line. Pakhtuns are our strength, as much as they are the strength of Afghanistan, as well as a very important element of our foreign policy. During the last military regime, our relations with the Pakhtuns were tarnished, which must be repaired now to the level to provide the foundation for the formation of the Union of three countries – Pakistan - Afghanistan and Iran, to give the much needed “Strategic Depth” to the region. Our relations with China are the bed-rock of our foreign policy. China must be taken, as a friend, hand-in-hand to undertake diplomatic initiatives, as the fleeting moments of opportunity appear, which we must seize to make the best of them.

India would act like a wounded python after meeting set-backs in Afghanistan and would flex its military muscles to frighten Pakistan and intimidate, by acts of terror and actions, such as stopping the fresh water of the rivers, flowing into Pakistan. We have to take these provocations coolly; ready to challenge India, in our own time. Diplomatic and political maneuvers are essential, whereas the military strategy must be based on the principles of ‘asymmetric war’, of the present day times, where ‘men and missiles’ have emerged victorious on the battlefields of Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan, against the most powerful countries, equipped with the best of technologies. Thus, there is a big role, for the Pakhtun Power, in our future conflict with India, to decide once for all the issue of Kashmir.

We have to play a very aggressive diplomatic and political role, to help Afghanistan find peace. Essentially the steps that need to be taken, to achieve the objectives are:

Occupation forces to give a time-frame for withdrawal and declare a cease-fire. Start dialogue with the Taliban and Northern Alliance, to form the Loe Jirga, to decide the main issues, such as:

Formation of the Interim government for a period of three years; holding of the Census; framing of a Constitution; rebuilding of Institutions; massive reconstruction of the infrastructure and re-create ethnic balance, which has been disturbed since the Bonn Conference of 2001.

Hold elections in the year 2013.

Such are the opportunities and the challenges demanding correct and timely responses, to establish the foundation for peace, in the Afpak region, and extend it beyond to other regions. This can be achieved only with the cooperation of all our neighbours and friends, working on the golden principles of “Peace, Cooperation and Engagement,” as propounded and practiced by China. No doubt “Now is the time for all of us to take our share of responsibility for a global response, to global challenges.” Roger Cohen. Martin Luther King very rightly said: “He, who passively accepts evil is as much involved in it as he who help to perpetrate it.” And ‘Mother of all Evil’, is occupation of Afghanistan. When evil is removed, peace would prevail.

Courtesy: Opinion-maker

Operation launched in Waziristan

By Ikramullah
October 21, 2009

The green signal by the Government of Pakistan has finally been given to the armed forces. The internal and external challenges, involving, besides many other factors, had created such a critical situation, culminating in a national security crisis, that hardly any other option was left before the government. The federal government, led by the Pakistan Peoples’ Party, could not possibly take such a decision without taking all the major political forces in confidence, both inside and outside the Parliament. Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, who had just returned from China, rose to the occasion and called the civil and military leadership of Pakistan on Friday morning (October 16), for a joint meeting to make the momentous decision at this critical juncture of Pakistan’s history. Before presiding over the roundtable conference, Prime Minister Gilani called on President Asif Ali Zardari at Aiwan-E-Sadr in Islamabad to apprise him of the challenges facing the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. And also about his proposed strategy to deal with the alarming threat posed by the new wave of terrorism spreading like fire, engulfing the major cities including Islamabad, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Kohat and Peshawar. I believe that time has come to rise above party politics and face the stark reality - Pakistan’s survival is at stake.
The Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani along with his top operational and intelligence chiefs had been specially invited to this crucial meeting. Besides them, leaders of different political parties including Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, Asfandyar Wali Khan, Mian Shahbaz Sharif, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, Dr Farooq Sattar, Senator Israrullah Zehri, Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao, and other senior government official were also present during the meeting, in order to take the nation into confidence through their elected representatives. Undoubtedly, the credit for managing to get together this rare galaxy of political leadership at a short notice goes not only to Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani’s leadership but also the patriotism of the national leadership that rose to the occasion recognising the grave threat to the very existence of the state. I stress this point because in this demonstration of national unity lies the strength of our nation.
The political leadership of Pakistan has entrusted to the armed forces the arduous task of safeguarding the territorial integrity. There was free discussion over nuts and bolts of the planned offensive in Waziristan including internally displaced persons and their management as undertaken by the joint efforts of the civil and military authorities during the Swat and Malakand Operation. Lt Gen Nadeem Ahmad, who had taken care of the IDPs from Swat and their safe return to their homes, was also present in the Prime Minister’s meeting indicating the details covered during the four hour long meeting. The political leadership representing the Pakistani nation is believed to have not only granted unanimous approval of the likely operation in Waziristan but assured full support to the armed forces in this extremely difficult venture in a difficult terrain during the coming winter. It is believed that soon after the green signal from the government, the army has now swung into action in South Waziristan with imposition of curfew in different areas from early morning on October 17. The operation is likely to end successfully and hopefully before the start of the New Year. It is estimated that over a lac and quarter population is likely to be evacuated to safer areas in NWFP, Punjab and Balochistan. The army is likely to place the entire area of South Waziristan under surveillance in order to prevent any outside intervention in the operational area. This has put the government as well as the armed forces under the most critical test since the birth of Pakistan. To come out victorious the armed forces will need undivided and total support of the entire nation. I am confident the nation shall not fail in its duty and shall adhere to “Unity Faith and Discipline”, the call of the Founder of the nation Quaid-i-Azam at the fateful moment of every national crisis.
Courtesy: The Nation

Terrorist surge and its implications

TARIQ OSMAN HYDER
October 21, 2009

There has been a surge of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The most audacious being the precision assault on the headquarters of the Pakistan Army followed by the coordinated triple attack on FIA and Police establishments in Lahore, accompanied by daily bomb blasts. The army is now a major target after its largely successful operation in Swat and because of a major offensive under way in South Waziristan, followed by the FIA and Police. The Swat operation was a milestone in the counter terrorism campaign. It was made possible only by the build-up of public, political and media support, on which the sustainability of the effort depends.
For the outside world and Pakistan this spate of attacks raises a number of questions. Is the security situation deteriorating and will the military, paramilitary and police forces be put on the defensive with heightened public insecurity eroding public morale? What response strategy can deliver? The US media has criticised the army's security for not stopping the attack at the outermost security cordon perimeter. This critique implies that the military's capacity in the counter terrorism campaign depends in significant part on the controversial Kerry-Lugar assistance legislation.
To analyse what the present situation portends one must view this struggle between the forces for a progressive Pakistan and the militants' vision of a theocratic Pakistan in the context of national dynamics, regional and international parallels and of the timescale and resources required to win this battle for the soul of Pakistan.
As far as the Pakistan Army is concerned, while lessons should be learnt, the attack on its HQ was contained and took time to end because of the hostages. America, the most advanced country in the world was unable to prevent 9/11. The Mumbai attack virtually took another metropolis hostage. Despite massive military and monetary intervention in Iraq, the security situation has forced America into an exit strategy. While even more resources and troops are being poured into Afghanistan, attacks against civilians and the military are far higher than in Pakistan with its eleven times larger population.
Pakistan, like most developing countries and Muslim countries, is a fractured society with significant gaps between haves and have-nots. Developmental efforts have not been well planned or competently administered due to the lack of political stability or good governance and deteriorating state institutions. The hegemonistic ambitions of India and its unwillingness to move on the Kashmir dispute necessitated large defence expenditures. The erosion of the government's public education system has divided the youth into three streams: those attending private schools who reap the opportunities; those going to government schools who are at a grave disadvantage; and the resourceless multitude attending the madrassahs, which had a revered place in Muslim education, but since the American sponsored Afghan Jihad have become the driving force for discontented youth.
The battle against the militants has become multi-dimensional. In border regions, military counter insurgency coupled with re-establishing administration and development will predominate. In settled areas, urban warfare with the terrorists using asymmetrical acts of explosive violence and precision attacks against the symbols of the state will have to be dealt with through different tactics including better intelligence gathering and coordination to more aggressively utilising existing military and civil resources.
The strength of the militants and their access to arms from Afghanistan is dependent on funding. Some comes from drug money and hostile intelligence agencies across the border. A small part is raised within Pakistan. However the largest amount is received by transfers using both banking and illegal channels. This is borne out by the fact that while from documented remittance flows some seven billion dollars a year comes from overseas workers, a grey area of four million dollars comes ostensibly for charitable, educational and other purposes from other parties. Pakistan must forcibly address this problem with known conduit countries and by activating its investigative and regulatory mechanisms, including the State Bank's Financial Investigation Unit and the FIA. Certainly, the United States has the muscle to do more on this vital external funding front.
It will take five to 10 years to defeat the militant threat. The East Punjab insurgency in a far smaller area took 10 years to overcome, the LTTE 30 years. It will take a generation to reverse causational social conditions. That is the scale on which to assess whether or not the security situation in Pakistan is deteriorating. The militants have been hard hit and are fighting back to break the public and governmental resolve. Continued military operations in South Waziristan and elsewhere will lead to increased terrorist attacks, but the losses they inflict should be far less than what is meted out to them.
While democracy must be strengthened, the army remains the strongest and most cohesive force in Pakistan which can tackle the terrorist threat. However, its counterinsurgency and surveillance capabilities must be improved. Equally important, socio-economic development has to be accelerated.
The now passed Kerry-Lugar Bill contains clauses detrimental to Pakistan's self-respect which should have been modified. However, the controversy missed the main point that if America and its Western allies are serious about defeating terrorism the assistance must be at least three to five times more in order to help Pakistan overcome this threat, part of a global terrorist network strengthened by their occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. Pakistan must also diversify incoming assistance, lessen dependence on American military assistance, expand and add value to its exports to generate its own resources. Our window of vulnerability lies in our deficit balance of payments, between what we earn and what we spend, which necessitates external assistance from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and bilateral sources with inevitable conditionalities, which circumscribes our freedom of manoeuvre and policy choices.
Without adequate multinational economic and military equipment support and also action by the Extra Regional Forces to control the border from the Afghan side, the battle in Pakistan will take far longer. It is also in India's interest to live up to its declared objective of wanting good relations with a stable Pakistan. Certainly, if there is evidence to the contrary it must be made public by our government.
The writer is a retired Pakistani diplomat.
Courtesy: The Nation