By Rafia Zakaria
Wednesday, 14 Oct, 2009
ACCORDING to the New York Times, from August 2008 to August 2009 there have been approximately 60 drone strikes inside Pakistani territory. The number of drone strikes roughly equalled the nearly 65 suicide bombings in Pakistan in this period. These 60 drone strikes show a 12-fold increase in the number since 2007 which saw only five drone attacks.
On the other hand, the number of suicide bombings in Pakistan remained unchanged despite the escalation in drone attacks: there were 60 in August 2007 and 65 in August 2009.
There is much to interpret in these statistics particularly in light of the fact that drones are once again being touted as a magic cure that would deliver the United States from failure in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The American argument in favour of them proceeds thus: Pakistan will not allow US and Nato troops in its territory and hence drones are a convenient means of attacking “high-value targets” without tangibly impinging on Pakistani sovereignty.
The delivery of targets such as the recent death of Baitullah Mehsud are offered by American military strategists as proof of the ubiquitous value of remote-controlled drones as a means of evading questions of territorial sovereignty while also accomplishing military objectives. Politically, the drones are also an easier sell for American politicians to their constituencies: there is no imminent threat of a cavalcade of dead soldiers arriving in flag-draped coffins. At the same time, the ability to strike out Al Qaeda targets continues to be the campaign narrative of the Obama administration that resolutely touted the group’s elimination as the “right war”.
But all this is old news familiar to Pakistani ears. What the comparative statistic of drones vs suicide attacks also illustrates is that despite the 12-fold increase in drone attacks in the tribal regions by the United States, there has been no decrease in retaliatory suicide attacks by Taliban and their affiliated militants. It is this fact that should stick in the throat of many an American military commander who would like to insist that the drones’ successful elimination of the leadership cadres of both Al Qaeda and the Taliban is reaping dividends in improving the security of the region.
In other words, the fact that the number of suicide attacks in Pakistan has not budged an inch since the increase in drone attacks points to the truth that despite the supposed elimination of leadership, the capacity of the Taliban to organise and execute suicide attacks has not been diminished. It has been observed that the number of Pakistanis that support collaboration with the United States in the war on terror has predictably fallen as the number of drone attacks have increased. In 2005, when there was only a single drone attack in Pakistan, nearly half the country supported working with the US. Now scores of drone attacks and hundreds of civilian casualties later the number has dwindled to little more than 30 per cent.
The contrast is thus damning. Somewhere in the United States, a drone operator sits in a booth with a joystick and commandeers a pilot-less aircraft armed with deadly bombs. He stares at a computer monitor and enters in coordinates provided by elaborate GIS systems and, much like in a video game, aims, shoots and fires at targets he sees on a satellite map. The pilot, based on video and satellite data, chooses to bomb or not bomb. The decision to kill is made infinitely easier by the remoteness of the act and the geographic removal of the pilot from those he will kill. Sometimes the target is killed and sometimes the intelligence is faulty and a sleeping family or a wedding party bears the brunt of the miscalculation.
At all times, however, the Taliban capitalise on the ensuing mayhem and gain new recruits and re-energise old ones. Terror thus spreads not simply in the village where the drone attack has taken place but far and wide in the bazaars of Peshawar and the streets of Lahore and the offices of Islamabad where these recruits avenge their anger against the drone attacks.
According to a report published by the Brookings Institution in July, the ratio of civilians to militants killed by drone attacks is 10:1. If the tragedy of 10 civilians dying for every Al Qaeda or Taliban operative killed is not in itself enough to force a reconsideration of the utility of drones then the fact that the capacity of the Taliban or Al Qaeda to carry out suicide attacks is unaffected by the elimination of these leaders must surely be.
Remote warfare is thus remote only in its inability to impress upon its operators the tremendous cost of taking human lives. In its ability to induce human suffering and effect hatred against an invisible enemy that kills at the press of a button and the prompting of a computer screen it is proximate real and immediate. If these costs are evaluated for what they are and not interspersed with political spin that paints the delivery of every Al Qaeda or Taliban target as an incontrovertible win for the US then the mystery of the Pakistani people’s ire towards the United States will be quite easily solved.
If US military commanders and political leaders continue to believe that sacrificing 10 civilians for the possibility of eliminating a handful of Al Qaeda or Taliban leaders is a fair bargain then little hope remains for the partnership. While both Al Qaeda and the Taliban are existential threats to the Pakistani state and to the collective security of both nations the expectation that the casualties and political cost of fighting them should only be borne by Pakistan is destined for failure.
As the debate over the Kerry-Lugar bill amply demonstrates, the relationship between the United States and Pakistan is at a crossroads. The revulsion most Pakistanis feel at being handed out pennies in exchange for absorbing the human and political cost of drone attacks points to an alienation that goes beyond questions of sovereignty and towards deeper issues of how many thousands of Pakistani lives must be lost to appease the American quest for security.
The writer is an attorney and director at Amnesty International, USA.
Courtesy: Dawn
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
Not Vietnam, not yet
by Tariq Fatemi
THERE was no intention to write on Afghanistan so soon after the last column but it appears that an impression has been created that the Obama administration has reached the conclusion that it may have no other option but to withdraw US troops from that country.
Moreover, President Barack Obama recently asserted that Afghanistan was not Vietnam, which shows his apprehension that Afghanistan is reviving the nightmarish memories of Vietnam that are seared in the American psyche. Hence the need to revisit the issue.Obama is increasingly giving the impression of a beleaguered leader, confronted by powerful lobbies determined to sabotage his well-intentioned proposals, whether they include domestic health reforms or his Middle East initiative. But it is Afghanistan that could cripple his administration and tar him for all times.
The situation is not getting better, with a Taliban resurgence that has surprised US commanders. August proved to be the bloodiest month for US forces, which further reduced popular support for the war. Gen Stanley McChrystal, Nato commander in Afghanistan, has already warned that without additional troops, the Afghan war is “likely to result in failure”, but Obama’s fellow liberals are accusing him of damaging their electoral prospects, while Republicans are urging him not to succumb to misplaced public sentiments.
In the meanwhile, another harsh reality is that a discredited and controversial Hamid Karzai continues as president. The US will have to deal with an Afghan leader who has little credibility at home and even less legitimacy abroad. Former US President Jimmy Carter has accused Karzai of “stealing the elections”, while rejecting the suggestion that the US should send more troops to Afghanistan. Will mounting setbacks in Afghanistan and growing opposition within the US convince Obama to cut his losses and withdraw his forces from a land popularly known as the ‘graveyard of empires’? Here it should be recalled that although the immediate reason for the invasion of Afghanistan was 9/11, the US objective was far more ambitious.
In fact, many US analysts lamented the US decision to walk away from Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal. The country’s strategic location makes it a critical player on more than one count. It is seen as the most convenient gateway to the energy-rich resources of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. Since 9/11, the US presence in the region has strengthened — a fact that has not gone down well with either Moscow or Beijing. Another major development has been Nato’s dramatic eastward expansion, much to the surprise of observers who had expected the alliance to fall apart in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Its operations thousands of miles away from its originally mandated theatre of command have added to deep misgivings in the region.
Nevertheless, any decision to withdraw from Afghanistan without achieving an outright victory — a remote possibility — or even a contrived exit will not be simple. Within the US, Obama is likely to be savaged by the rightwing conservatives and evangelists, who have always had reservations about him, while America’s standing would be further damaged. Moreover, a US withdrawal from Afghanistan would leave it with little justification for its growing presence in Central Asia where it has been establishing military bases and other facilities.
Nato’s ambition to be a global player, operating far beyond its originally envisaged sphere of operations, would be destroyed for the foreseeable future and leave the organisation bereft of any purpose. This would represent a major victory for China and Russia that are seeking to extend their influence deeper in their neighbourhood. This may explain why the prima donnas of the foreign policy establishment like Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, are expressing alarm at the rapidly eroding support for the Afghan war. They advise patience, while admitting that if the European allies were to leave the US alone in Afghanistan, it would “probably spell the end of the alliance”. Brzezinski has expressed support for the Anglo-German initiative for a new international conference on Afghanistan seeking a military strategy supported by the developmental approach to help prolong the European presence in Afghanistan as then Europe would be “less likely to leave us in the lurch”.
Britain’s special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Sir Sherard Cowper–Coles, also warned that while the situation in Afghanistan was deeply worrying, abandonment of that country was not an option because “walking away would destroy everything that has been achieved”. Admitting, however, that higher casualties would have a profound impact on public opinion in the West, he suggests that the solution lies in devolving political power back to the tribal elders who have traditionally held sway in Afghanistan and channelling funds for developmental projects through them.
Given the limited options before Obama, it is not unlikely that there will be renewed efforts to make the Afghan war more ‘efficient’, ‘cost-effective’ and ‘sustainable’, in a way that does not hurt the US leader at home when the next presidential election campaign begins. This would need an Iraqlike situation in Afghanistan, whereby major elements from within the Taliban are co-opted, enhancing the government’s legitimacy and credibility, while shifting most of the fighting to a trained and expanded Afghan force. The US would rely more on air power and counterinsurgency operations in Pakistan which will be called upon to accept a bigger share of the burden. Will all this make the US mission more viable? Only time will tell, though the signs are not encouraging. The ghosts of Vietnam are not likely to be exorcised soon.
Courtesy: Dawn
THERE was no intention to write on Afghanistan so soon after the last column but it appears that an impression has been created that the Obama administration has reached the conclusion that it may have no other option but to withdraw US troops from that country.
Moreover, President Barack Obama recently asserted that Afghanistan was not Vietnam, which shows his apprehension that Afghanistan is reviving the nightmarish memories of Vietnam that are seared in the American psyche. Hence the need to revisit the issue.Obama is increasingly giving the impression of a beleaguered leader, confronted by powerful lobbies determined to sabotage his well-intentioned proposals, whether they include domestic health reforms or his Middle East initiative. But it is Afghanistan that could cripple his administration and tar him for all times.
The situation is not getting better, with a Taliban resurgence that has surprised US commanders. August proved to be the bloodiest month for US forces, which further reduced popular support for the war. Gen Stanley McChrystal, Nato commander in Afghanistan, has already warned that without additional troops, the Afghan war is “likely to result in failure”, but Obama’s fellow liberals are accusing him of damaging their electoral prospects, while Republicans are urging him not to succumb to misplaced public sentiments.
In the meanwhile, another harsh reality is that a discredited and controversial Hamid Karzai continues as president. The US will have to deal with an Afghan leader who has little credibility at home and even less legitimacy abroad. Former US President Jimmy Carter has accused Karzai of “stealing the elections”, while rejecting the suggestion that the US should send more troops to Afghanistan. Will mounting setbacks in Afghanistan and growing opposition within the US convince Obama to cut his losses and withdraw his forces from a land popularly known as the ‘graveyard of empires’? Here it should be recalled that although the immediate reason for the invasion of Afghanistan was 9/11, the US objective was far more ambitious.
In fact, many US analysts lamented the US decision to walk away from Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal. The country’s strategic location makes it a critical player on more than one count. It is seen as the most convenient gateway to the energy-rich resources of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. Since 9/11, the US presence in the region has strengthened — a fact that has not gone down well with either Moscow or Beijing. Another major development has been Nato’s dramatic eastward expansion, much to the surprise of observers who had expected the alliance to fall apart in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Its operations thousands of miles away from its originally mandated theatre of command have added to deep misgivings in the region.
Nevertheless, any decision to withdraw from Afghanistan without achieving an outright victory — a remote possibility — or even a contrived exit will not be simple. Within the US, Obama is likely to be savaged by the rightwing conservatives and evangelists, who have always had reservations about him, while America’s standing would be further damaged. Moreover, a US withdrawal from Afghanistan would leave it with little justification for its growing presence in Central Asia where it has been establishing military bases and other facilities.
Nato’s ambition to be a global player, operating far beyond its originally envisaged sphere of operations, would be destroyed for the foreseeable future and leave the organisation bereft of any purpose. This would represent a major victory for China and Russia that are seeking to extend their influence deeper in their neighbourhood. This may explain why the prima donnas of the foreign policy establishment like Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, are expressing alarm at the rapidly eroding support for the Afghan war. They advise patience, while admitting that if the European allies were to leave the US alone in Afghanistan, it would “probably spell the end of the alliance”. Brzezinski has expressed support for the Anglo-German initiative for a new international conference on Afghanistan seeking a military strategy supported by the developmental approach to help prolong the European presence in Afghanistan as then Europe would be “less likely to leave us in the lurch”.
Britain’s special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Sir Sherard Cowper–Coles, also warned that while the situation in Afghanistan was deeply worrying, abandonment of that country was not an option because “walking away would destroy everything that has been achieved”. Admitting, however, that higher casualties would have a profound impact on public opinion in the West, he suggests that the solution lies in devolving political power back to the tribal elders who have traditionally held sway in Afghanistan and channelling funds for developmental projects through them.
Given the limited options before Obama, it is not unlikely that there will be renewed efforts to make the Afghan war more ‘efficient’, ‘cost-effective’ and ‘sustainable’, in a way that does not hurt the US leader at home when the next presidential election campaign begins. This would need an Iraqlike situation in Afghanistan, whereby major elements from within the Taliban are co-opted, enhancing the government’s legitimacy and credibility, while shifting most of the fighting to a trained and expanded Afghan force. The US would rely more on air power and counterinsurgency operations in Pakistan which will be called upon to accept a bigger share of the burden. Will all this make the US mission more viable? Only time will tell, though the signs are not encouraging. The ghosts of Vietnam are not likely to be exorcised soon.
Courtesy: Dawn
The turning point
By Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
It is encouraging that civilian and military authorities are working together to fight the menace of terrorism. However, counter-terrorism should not degenerate into a stalemate because that would provide an excuse to some people to return to a pro-Taliban disposition
The successful meeting of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan on September 24 and approval of the Kerry-Lugar bill by the US Senate on the same day reflect the growing confidence of the international community in Pakistan’s counter-insurgency operations. All this acknowledges the Pakistani military’s successful operation in the Swat-Malakand area, dislodging the Taliban.
April 2009 can be described as the turning point in Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy. It was in this month that the civilian government and the top brass of the army came to the firm conclusion that the Taliban offensive against the Pakistani state had to be checked through the use of hard power. On April 26, the army initiated the operation in Swat-Malakand that reversed the Taliban tide that had assumed control of most of the area. Local administration was either non-existent or was at the mercy of the Swat Taliban.
This operation was more carefully planned and executed with greater firmness and consistency than was the case during various operations in the tribal areas in 2003-2006. Currently, the army is engaged in counter-insurgency actions in South Waziristan, Khyber and Orakzai agencies. The army and paramilitary have lost over 150 men and officers in these operations since April. The Pakistan Air Force also made useful contributions by targeting Taliban hideouts and training camps, making it possible for the army and paramilitary personnel to pursue ground offensives effectively.
The other positive aspect of the Swat operation relates to the efforts of the provincial and federal governments to care for displaced persons from the Swat-Malakand area. Some friendly countries, voluntary groups from Pakistan and abroad and the United Nations provided assistance to cope with this humanitarian problem. The ordinary people of Mardan and adjoining areas made the most significant contribution, who voluntarily hosted displaced people in their houses.
After the restoration of the civilian authority in the Swat area, the army and civilian authorities returned displaced people to their homes in an orderly manner. The current challenge pertains to reconstruction or restoration of schools, hospitals and public facilities destroyed by the Taliban. This should now be possible as new economic assistance for social development is going to be available to Pakistan in a couple of months. Another challenge is coping with remnants of the Swat Taliban hiding in mountains that occasionally engage in violent activities to harass the people and the government.
The Swat operation enjoyed widespread support in Pakistan. This support increased as the army registered successes. However, Islamic political parties, especially the Jama’at-e Islami, opposed the operation, describing it as the killing of Pakistanis at the behest of the United States, and that the Taliban are friends of Pakistan. They argued that the people who burnt down schools and killed people were not Taliban but agents of India, the United States and Israel posing as the Taliban.
The JI had to dilute its criticism after it realised that the people were not receptive to their criticism. They then shifted their focus of criticism to the American role in Pakistan, hoping that they would muster more support on this issue and embarrass the federal government on this issue if not on the Swat operation.
The counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency policy initiated in April has helped the military in general and the army in particular to partly retrieve its reputation and image that had suffered during the last three years of General Pervez Musharraf’s rule, especially in the course of the lawyers’ movement in 2007 and the second suspension of the constitution in November 2007. This action has also improved Pakistan’s diplomatic clout abroad because it showed the determination and capacity to cope with Pakistan-based terrorist groups.
The April decision of the civilian government and the army top brass to work together against the Taliban and other militant groups was more significant than Pakistan’s decision to join the United States in combating terrorism after 9/11.
Knowing General Zia-ul Haq’s model of US-Pakistan relations after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, Musharraf, after 9/11, agreed to join the US effort against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Musharraf supported the Americans on countering terrorism but continued to maintain links with selected Pakistan-based militant groups and some elements among the Taliban. Pakistan’s security forces arrested around 600 people, including some leading Al Qaeda activists, for their alleged links with that organisation. Action was taken against Pakistani militant groups and the Taliban but enough space was left for them to survive.
The Pakistani government and military authorities were divided on whether these groups were a liability or an asset for Pakistan. Their policy of maintaining links with selected militant groups was also shaped by their fear of the US leaving the region after its main goal was achieved, similar to the US decision to quit the region after the Soviets left Afghanistan. Both the military and the government lacked a shared clarity of purpose when the army resorted to military action from time to time in the tribal areas in 2003-2006.
The change in the disposition of the civilian government and the army top brass occurred in April this year because the Taliban overplayed their hand in 2008-2009, causing strong concern in official and non-official civilian and military circles that these groups wanted to undermine Pakistani state and society.
There were several developments in Swat and elsewhere during February-April 2009 that caused a high degree of insecurity in the society, including destruction of schools; killing of people who defied the Taliban; the video of a girl being flogged in public; the Taliban’s refusal to abide by the agreement with the NWFP government; statements questioning the legitimacy of Pakistan’s constitution and democracy; attempts to control Buner; and vigilantism by pro-Taliban hard-line Islamic activists in some of the major cities, including Lahore, Karachi and Rawalpindi. The threat of their march from Swat-Buner to Islamabad haunted the government and people.
The army has pushed back the Taliban tide in the Swat area. However, the Taliban and their allies remain entrenched in various tribal agencies. If the army cannot quickly dislodge them, it may get entangled in a long drawn out counter-insurgency.
Long inconclusive strife provides an opportunity to Islamic groups to become more active in propaganda against the military. Further, it seems ironic that some retired army and intelligence officers publicly question the rationale of the ongoing security operations in the tribal areas. Some senior officers who served during General Pervez Musharraf’s rule express varying degrees of scepticism, if not outright criticism, of the army’s current disposition on counter-insurgency.
It is encouraging that civilian and military authorities are working together to fight the menace of terrorism. However, counter-terrorism should not degenerate into a stalemate because that would provide an excuse to some people to return to a pro-Taliban disposition and target the army and paramilitary personnel with the same kind of demoralising propaganda that was proliferated in 2003-2006.
Courtesy: Daily Times
It is encouraging that civilian and military authorities are working together to fight the menace of terrorism. However, counter-terrorism should not degenerate into a stalemate because that would provide an excuse to some people to return to a pro-Taliban disposition
The successful meeting of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan on September 24 and approval of the Kerry-Lugar bill by the US Senate on the same day reflect the growing confidence of the international community in Pakistan’s counter-insurgency operations. All this acknowledges the Pakistani military’s successful operation in the Swat-Malakand area, dislodging the Taliban.
April 2009 can be described as the turning point in Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy. It was in this month that the civilian government and the top brass of the army came to the firm conclusion that the Taliban offensive against the Pakistani state had to be checked through the use of hard power. On April 26, the army initiated the operation in Swat-Malakand that reversed the Taliban tide that had assumed control of most of the area. Local administration was either non-existent or was at the mercy of the Swat Taliban.
This operation was more carefully planned and executed with greater firmness and consistency than was the case during various operations in the tribal areas in 2003-2006. Currently, the army is engaged in counter-insurgency actions in South Waziristan, Khyber and Orakzai agencies. The army and paramilitary have lost over 150 men and officers in these operations since April. The Pakistan Air Force also made useful contributions by targeting Taliban hideouts and training camps, making it possible for the army and paramilitary personnel to pursue ground offensives effectively.
The other positive aspect of the Swat operation relates to the efforts of the provincial and federal governments to care for displaced persons from the Swat-Malakand area. Some friendly countries, voluntary groups from Pakistan and abroad and the United Nations provided assistance to cope with this humanitarian problem. The ordinary people of Mardan and adjoining areas made the most significant contribution, who voluntarily hosted displaced people in their houses.
After the restoration of the civilian authority in the Swat area, the army and civilian authorities returned displaced people to their homes in an orderly manner. The current challenge pertains to reconstruction or restoration of schools, hospitals and public facilities destroyed by the Taliban. This should now be possible as new economic assistance for social development is going to be available to Pakistan in a couple of months. Another challenge is coping with remnants of the Swat Taliban hiding in mountains that occasionally engage in violent activities to harass the people and the government.
The Swat operation enjoyed widespread support in Pakistan. This support increased as the army registered successes. However, Islamic political parties, especially the Jama’at-e Islami, opposed the operation, describing it as the killing of Pakistanis at the behest of the United States, and that the Taliban are friends of Pakistan. They argued that the people who burnt down schools and killed people were not Taliban but agents of India, the United States and Israel posing as the Taliban.
The JI had to dilute its criticism after it realised that the people were not receptive to their criticism. They then shifted their focus of criticism to the American role in Pakistan, hoping that they would muster more support on this issue and embarrass the federal government on this issue if not on the Swat operation.
The counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency policy initiated in April has helped the military in general and the army in particular to partly retrieve its reputation and image that had suffered during the last three years of General Pervez Musharraf’s rule, especially in the course of the lawyers’ movement in 2007 and the second suspension of the constitution in November 2007. This action has also improved Pakistan’s diplomatic clout abroad because it showed the determination and capacity to cope with Pakistan-based terrorist groups.
The April decision of the civilian government and the army top brass to work together against the Taliban and other militant groups was more significant than Pakistan’s decision to join the United States in combating terrorism after 9/11.
Knowing General Zia-ul Haq’s model of US-Pakistan relations after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, Musharraf, after 9/11, agreed to join the US effort against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Musharraf supported the Americans on countering terrorism but continued to maintain links with selected Pakistan-based militant groups and some elements among the Taliban. Pakistan’s security forces arrested around 600 people, including some leading Al Qaeda activists, for their alleged links with that organisation. Action was taken against Pakistani militant groups and the Taliban but enough space was left for them to survive.
The Pakistani government and military authorities were divided on whether these groups were a liability or an asset for Pakistan. Their policy of maintaining links with selected militant groups was also shaped by their fear of the US leaving the region after its main goal was achieved, similar to the US decision to quit the region after the Soviets left Afghanistan. Both the military and the government lacked a shared clarity of purpose when the army resorted to military action from time to time in the tribal areas in 2003-2006.
The change in the disposition of the civilian government and the army top brass occurred in April this year because the Taliban overplayed their hand in 2008-2009, causing strong concern in official and non-official civilian and military circles that these groups wanted to undermine Pakistani state and society.
There were several developments in Swat and elsewhere during February-April 2009 that caused a high degree of insecurity in the society, including destruction of schools; killing of people who defied the Taliban; the video of a girl being flogged in public; the Taliban’s refusal to abide by the agreement with the NWFP government; statements questioning the legitimacy of Pakistan’s constitution and democracy; attempts to control Buner; and vigilantism by pro-Taliban hard-line Islamic activists in some of the major cities, including Lahore, Karachi and Rawalpindi. The threat of their march from Swat-Buner to Islamabad haunted the government and people.
The army has pushed back the Taliban tide in the Swat area. However, the Taliban and their allies remain entrenched in various tribal agencies. If the army cannot quickly dislodge them, it may get entangled in a long drawn out counter-insurgency.
Long inconclusive strife provides an opportunity to Islamic groups to become more active in propaganda against the military. Further, it seems ironic that some retired army and intelligence officers publicly question the rationale of the ongoing security operations in the tribal areas. Some senior officers who served during General Pervez Musharraf’s rule express varying degrees of scepticism, if not outright criticism, of the army’s current disposition on counter-insurgency.
It is encouraging that civilian and military authorities are working together to fight the menace of terrorism. However, counter-terrorism should not degenerate into a stalemate because that would provide an excuse to some people to return to a pro-Taliban disposition and target the army and paramilitary personnel with the same kind of demoralising propaganda that was proliferated in 2003-2006.
Courtesy: Daily Times
Pakistan turns to drones of its own
By:Alex Rodriguez
Oct 09,2009
Pakistan's citizens are irked by U.S.drones and its requests to buy them from Washington have been rebuffed.So it owns and operates Italian made models a version of which it is developing itself.In the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan people are accustomed to the hum of American drones overhead and don't like it.The drones kill civilians as well as militants they say and their use also tramples Pakistani sovereignty.
This summer in the Swat Valley Pakistanis again heard drones whirring in the sky but there was a difference.They were Pakistani owned and operated a toe in the water foray into a technology that is revolutionizing warfare.They weren't missile carrying drones like the ones used by the U.S.but unmanned aerial vehicles that sent images of targets back to Pakistani command posts.Symbolically however they were crucial baby steps for a country desperate to develop its own fleet to better combat a home grown militancy.
Rebuffed for security reasons in its efforts to buy unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs from the United States Pakistan instead bought unarmed Falco reconnaissance drones from Italy.And in a small glass walled laboratory at a state owned defense enterprise here in Kamra east of Islamabad it is gearing up to produce its own modern tactical drones similar to the Falcos it used over the Swat Valley.Drones have dramatically changed the landscape of war from Iraq to the Afghan Pakistani border.U.S.drones equipped with Hellfire missiles have been one of the most effective weapons against Al Qaeda and Taliban militants hiding out in Pakistan's tribal areas killing at least nine top leaders.
A drone strike Aug.5 killed Baitullah Mahsud the Pakistani Taliban leader blamed for overseeing many of the suicide bomb attacks throughout the country as well as the December 2007 assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.For years private Pakistani aviation firms have manufactured small less sophisticated drones which have been used for purposes such as ground to air target practice.The government has repeatedly asked Washington to give it weapons carrying drones like the ones used by the U.S.military to strike militant targets in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas the badlands along the Afghan border that serve as safe haven for Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters.
Washington has refused however citing its concerns that Pakistan's intelligence services could pass on sensitive data about the drones and their operation to militant leaders.Pakistan has not stopped trying to acquire drones from the United States but it has decided to begin making its own.The Pakistan Aeronautical Complex a state owned defense manufacturer is teaming up with the Italian company Selex Galileo to produce the Falco locally.Pakistani technicians at Kamra are still in training and several months away from beginning to manufacture them.In the meantime Pakistan decided to buy about two dozen Falcos from Italy and put them to use in Swat.
The Pakistani military relied heavily on fighter jet airstrikes to eliminate Taliban infrastructure in Swat and aerial images taken by Falco drones helped them pinpoint those targets."Our recent area of interest has been the war on terror and we've deployed [Falco drones] very successfully " said Air Marshal Farhat Hussain Khan chairman of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex."It's been extremely useful in the current situation." Falco drones Khan said were used during the Swat offensive to locate "all kinds of targets ranging from hide outs bunkers ammo dumps pickets and other [Taliban] infrastructure."
Defense analyst Talat Masood a retired Pakistani general said producing surveillance drones will be a good first step toward Pakistan's eventual goal of having UAVs capable of carrying missiles."My own assessment is that they have helped in improving intelligence and operations capability of the Pakistani army in Swat " Masood said."If they were equipped with missiles then Pakistan would take a quantum leap in counter insurgency capability."The Pakistani public would probably be more tolerant of civilian casualties caused by drones produced and operated by the country's own forces Masood said.
"If an American drone attacks and there's collateral damage there's huge anti American sentiment here " he said."At the same time Pakistani civilians have died during Pakistani military operations and it doesn't generate the same kind of sentiment."Though the United States won't supply Pakistan with drones it has at times shared surveillance data gathered by American UAVs.Pakistan in turn has been more cooperative in providing intelligence to help U.S.drones find their targets.The drone strike against Mahsud was preceded by Pakistani intelligence that helped the U.S.pinpoint his whereabouts.
Lt.Col.Gohar Majeed who is helping lead drone production at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex said the country's air force would like the firm to build eight to 10 drones.The Falcos produced in Pakistan like the Italian made aircraft won't have strike capability and won't be able to fly nearly as long as the CIA's Predator and Reaper drones.The Falco's flight endurance time is eight to 14 hours whereas the Predator's flight duration record is 40 hours."It's got limited range and limited payload capability " said a spokesman for the Pakistani air force who spoke on condition of anonymity."We do get real time pictures from it....It's a tactical tool."
Pakistan's ultimate desire drones equipped with missiles can eventually be achieved by modifying existing UAVs Khan said.The question he can't answer is how long that will take."Two or three years is not enough time to develop such a program " Khan said."But everything's possible.There are no hurdles that cannot be crossed."
Courtesy: Los Angeles Times
Oct 09,2009
Pakistan's citizens are irked by U.S.drones and its requests to buy them from Washington have been rebuffed.So it owns and operates Italian made models a version of which it is developing itself.In the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan people are accustomed to the hum of American drones overhead and don't like it.The drones kill civilians as well as militants they say and their use also tramples Pakistani sovereignty.
This summer in the Swat Valley Pakistanis again heard drones whirring in the sky but there was a difference.They were Pakistani owned and operated a toe in the water foray into a technology that is revolutionizing warfare.They weren't missile carrying drones like the ones used by the U.S.but unmanned aerial vehicles that sent images of targets back to Pakistani command posts.Symbolically however they were crucial baby steps for a country desperate to develop its own fleet to better combat a home grown militancy.
Rebuffed for security reasons in its efforts to buy unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs from the United States Pakistan instead bought unarmed Falco reconnaissance drones from Italy.And in a small glass walled laboratory at a state owned defense enterprise here in Kamra east of Islamabad it is gearing up to produce its own modern tactical drones similar to the Falcos it used over the Swat Valley.Drones have dramatically changed the landscape of war from Iraq to the Afghan Pakistani border.U.S.drones equipped with Hellfire missiles have been one of the most effective weapons against Al Qaeda and Taliban militants hiding out in Pakistan's tribal areas killing at least nine top leaders.
A drone strike Aug.5 killed Baitullah Mahsud the Pakistani Taliban leader blamed for overseeing many of the suicide bomb attacks throughout the country as well as the December 2007 assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.For years private Pakistani aviation firms have manufactured small less sophisticated drones which have been used for purposes such as ground to air target practice.The government has repeatedly asked Washington to give it weapons carrying drones like the ones used by the U.S.military to strike militant targets in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas the badlands along the Afghan border that serve as safe haven for Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters.
Washington has refused however citing its concerns that Pakistan's intelligence services could pass on sensitive data about the drones and their operation to militant leaders.Pakistan has not stopped trying to acquire drones from the United States but it has decided to begin making its own.The Pakistan Aeronautical Complex a state owned defense manufacturer is teaming up with the Italian company Selex Galileo to produce the Falco locally.Pakistani technicians at Kamra are still in training and several months away from beginning to manufacture them.In the meantime Pakistan decided to buy about two dozen Falcos from Italy and put them to use in Swat.
The Pakistani military relied heavily on fighter jet airstrikes to eliminate Taliban infrastructure in Swat and aerial images taken by Falco drones helped them pinpoint those targets."Our recent area of interest has been the war on terror and we've deployed [Falco drones] very successfully " said Air Marshal Farhat Hussain Khan chairman of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex."It's been extremely useful in the current situation." Falco drones Khan said were used during the Swat offensive to locate "all kinds of targets ranging from hide outs bunkers ammo dumps pickets and other [Taliban] infrastructure."
Defense analyst Talat Masood a retired Pakistani general said producing surveillance drones will be a good first step toward Pakistan's eventual goal of having UAVs capable of carrying missiles."My own assessment is that they have helped in improving intelligence and operations capability of the Pakistani army in Swat " Masood said."If they were equipped with missiles then Pakistan would take a quantum leap in counter insurgency capability."The Pakistani public would probably be more tolerant of civilian casualties caused by drones produced and operated by the country's own forces Masood said.
"If an American drone attacks and there's collateral damage there's huge anti American sentiment here " he said."At the same time Pakistani civilians have died during Pakistani military operations and it doesn't generate the same kind of sentiment."Though the United States won't supply Pakistan with drones it has at times shared surveillance data gathered by American UAVs.Pakistan in turn has been more cooperative in providing intelligence to help U.S.drones find their targets.The drone strike against Mahsud was preceded by Pakistani intelligence that helped the U.S.pinpoint his whereabouts.
Lt.Col.Gohar Majeed who is helping lead drone production at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex said the country's air force would like the firm to build eight to 10 drones.The Falcos produced in Pakistan like the Italian made aircraft won't have strike capability and won't be able to fly nearly as long as the CIA's Predator and Reaper drones.The Falco's flight endurance time is eight to 14 hours whereas the Predator's flight duration record is 40 hours."It's got limited range and limited payload capability " said a spokesman for the Pakistani air force who spoke on condition of anonymity."We do get real time pictures from it....It's a tactical tool."
Pakistan's ultimate desire drones equipped with missiles can eventually be achieved by modifying existing UAVs Khan said.The question he can't answer is how long that will take."Two or three years is not enough time to develop such a program " Khan said."But everything's possible.There are no hurdles that cannot be crossed."
Courtesy: Los Angeles Times
Pakistan Braces for Taliban Attacks as It Prepares Offensive
By:Salman Masood
The Pakistani interior minister said Tuesday that the government is expecting more attacks by the Taliban as the military prepares to launch a major offensive in South Waziristan the rugged northwestern tribal region considered a stronghold of Taliban.The minister Rehman Malik also accused the Taliban of orchestrating the suicide bombing of the headquarters of the World Food Program in Islamabad on Monday.The blast killed five people four Pakistanis and an Iraqi and led the United Nations to shutter its offices in Pakistan.
A Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq confirmed his group was behind the bombing in a phone conversation with The Associated Press.“We proudly claim the responsibility for the suicide attack at the U.N.office in Islamabad.We will send more bombers for such attacks ” he told The A.P.adding that the Taliban would not target Muslim relief groups.Speaking to reporters at an Islamabad hospital while visiting some of those injured in the bombing Mr.Malik said Taliban militants in the northern valley of Swat were waiting until after the Muslim holiday of Id al Fitr to launch their assaults.
He also said Taliban leaders in Waziristan had recently gathered to plan their attacks to avenge the death of their leader Baitullah Mehsud who was killed in August in a U.S.drone strike.Mr.Malik also cast doubt over a new video purportedly showing Hakimullah Mehsud the new leader of the Pakistani Taliban.He said the person in the video instead appears to be Hakimullahs brother who bears a strong resemblance to Hakimullah.
Pakistani government and intelligence officials believe Hakimullah a young and brash insurgent commander died in a power struggle among rival militant chiefs after the former leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed.Intelligence officers were surprised to learn of the video which was made during an interview that Hakimullah Mehsud if thats who it was apparently gave on Sunday to a small group of reporters.One of the reporters Anwar Mehsud who works with a Pakistani television channel Aaj TV said Monday that Hakimullah Mehsud had invited the group to dispel the reports that he had been killed.
Even as late as Monday however one Pakistani intelligence official said he had been told that Hakimullah Mehsud was confirmed dead.According to the television reporter Hakimullah Mehsud also used the interview session to dispel any notion of a split within the Pakistani Taliban.He appeared with his top lieutenants in a show of unity Waliur Rehman the head of the Taliban in South Waziristan Qari Hussain the organizer of the Talibans suicide bomb squad and Azam Tariq the new spokesman for the Taliban.
Reporters from Islamabad were also invited but declined to go because of security concerns something the bombing at the World Food Program in Islamabad underscored.Mr.Malik said the bomber was dressed in the uniform of the Frontier Corps a paramilitary unit assigned to guard diplomatic missions in the area raising questions of whether he had assistance from others working inside the compound.Mr.Malik said that the bomber asked for permission to use the bathroom entered the building and detonated about 16 pounds of explosives in the lobby just after noon when the compound was filled with people.
The police said the attack was especially worrisome because it occurred at the heavily fortified United Nations compound that was tightly guarded by private security officers.About 80 people work at the compound a three story building in an upscale residential neighborhood.The building is also equipped with video surveillance cameras motion detectors and explosives detection devices.The street was barricaded at both ends and vehicles and visitors were supposed to be allowed entry only after a thorough security check.The outer walls of the building were secured by barbed wire and a paramilitary post was located within walking distance.
It was the first direct attack against a United Nations agency here in the Pakistani capital and U.N.officials quickly moved to close their offices in Pakistan.“This is a temporary arrangement to ensure the safety and security of our staff ” Ishrat Rizvi the spokeswoman for United Nations operations in Islamabad said by telephone.A prominent international presence here the World Food Program says it provides food aid to as many as 10 million people across Pakistan including many of those displaced by the militarys operations against Taliban militants in tribal areas and the Swat Valley.
The United Nations secretary general Ban Ki moon in a statement from Geneva called the bombing a “heinous crime committed against those who have been working tirelessly to assist the poor and the vulnerable on the frontlines of hunger and other human suffering in Pakistan.”
Pir Zubair Shah contributed reporting from Islamabad Mark McDonald from Hong Kong and Sharon Otterman from New York.
Courtesy: New York Times
The Pakistani interior minister said Tuesday that the government is expecting more attacks by the Taliban as the military prepares to launch a major offensive in South Waziristan the rugged northwestern tribal region considered a stronghold of Taliban.The minister Rehman Malik also accused the Taliban of orchestrating the suicide bombing of the headquarters of the World Food Program in Islamabad on Monday.The blast killed five people four Pakistanis and an Iraqi and led the United Nations to shutter its offices in Pakistan.
A Taliban spokesman Azam Tariq confirmed his group was behind the bombing in a phone conversation with The Associated Press.“We proudly claim the responsibility for the suicide attack at the U.N.office in Islamabad.We will send more bombers for such attacks ” he told The A.P.adding that the Taliban would not target Muslim relief groups.Speaking to reporters at an Islamabad hospital while visiting some of those injured in the bombing Mr.Malik said Taliban militants in the northern valley of Swat were waiting until after the Muslim holiday of Id al Fitr to launch their assaults.
He also said Taliban leaders in Waziristan had recently gathered to plan their attacks to avenge the death of their leader Baitullah Mehsud who was killed in August in a U.S.drone strike.Mr.Malik also cast doubt over a new video purportedly showing Hakimullah Mehsud the new leader of the Pakistani Taliban.He said the person in the video instead appears to be Hakimullahs brother who bears a strong resemblance to Hakimullah.
Pakistani government and intelligence officials believe Hakimullah a young and brash insurgent commander died in a power struggle among rival militant chiefs after the former leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed.Intelligence officers were surprised to learn of the video which was made during an interview that Hakimullah Mehsud if thats who it was apparently gave on Sunday to a small group of reporters.One of the reporters Anwar Mehsud who works with a Pakistani television channel Aaj TV said Monday that Hakimullah Mehsud had invited the group to dispel the reports that he had been killed.
Even as late as Monday however one Pakistani intelligence official said he had been told that Hakimullah Mehsud was confirmed dead.According to the television reporter Hakimullah Mehsud also used the interview session to dispel any notion of a split within the Pakistani Taliban.He appeared with his top lieutenants in a show of unity Waliur Rehman the head of the Taliban in South Waziristan Qari Hussain the organizer of the Talibans suicide bomb squad and Azam Tariq the new spokesman for the Taliban.
Reporters from Islamabad were also invited but declined to go because of security concerns something the bombing at the World Food Program in Islamabad underscored.Mr.Malik said the bomber was dressed in the uniform of the Frontier Corps a paramilitary unit assigned to guard diplomatic missions in the area raising questions of whether he had assistance from others working inside the compound.Mr.Malik said that the bomber asked for permission to use the bathroom entered the building and detonated about 16 pounds of explosives in the lobby just after noon when the compound was filled with people.
The police said the attack was especially worrisome because it occurred at the heavily fortified United Nations compound that was tightly guarded by private security officers.About 80 people work at the compound a three story building in an upscale residential neighborhood.The building is also equipped with video surveillance cameras motion detectors and explosives detection devices.The street was barricaded at both ends and vehicles and visitors were supposed to be allowed entry only after a thorough security check.The outer walls of the building were secured by barbed wire and a paramilitary post was located within walking distance.
It was the first direct attack against a United Nations agency here in the Pakistani capital and U.N.officials quickly moved to close their offices in Pakistan.“This is a temporary arrangement to ensure the safety and security of our staff ” Ishrat Rizvi the spokeswoman for United Nations operations in Islamabad said by telephone.A prominent international presence here the World Food Program says it provides food aid to as many as 10 million people across Pakistan including many of those displaced by the militarys operations against Taliban militants in tribal areas and the Swat Valley.
The United Nations secretary general Ban Ki moon in a statement from Geneva called the bombing a “heinous crime committed against those who have been working tirelessly to assist the poor and the vulnerable on the frontlines of hunger and other human suffering in Pakistan.”
Pir Zubair Shah contributed reporting from Islamabad Mark McDonald from Hong Kong and Sharon Otterman from New York.
Courtesy: New York Times
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